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PA YNE AND SUFFERING-A PERSONAL REFLECTION
AND A VICTIM-CENTERED CRITIQUE
VIVIAN BERGER*
1. INTRODUCTION
ANUARY 2, 1992, marked the sixth anniversary of my intense in-
volvement with capital punishment. In 1986 I was given a small
grant, about one-third of my normal salary, to visit full-time at the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF). Julius
Chambers, the Director Counsel of LDF, permitted me to select the
type of work I wanted. I chose to become a member of the Capital
Punishment Project.
During my tenure I took part in a number of significant cases.' The
one that interested me the most, Booth v. Maryland, is the focus of
this Article. In Booth,2 in which I authored a brief amicus curiae for
LDF in support of the petitioner, the United States Supreme Court in
a five-to-four decision invalidated a state law calling for victim impact
statements at sentencing trials in capital proceedings. Booth endured
for a scant four years; it was overruled by a majority of six justices in
Payne v. Tennessee,3 handed down on the last day of the 1990-91
Term.
In the following pages, I will discuss some facets of the checkered
career of the Booth principle in the Court and its sad, if predictable,
substitution by the Payne principle. As a general matter, I conclude
that the rule of Payne permitting victim impact evidence to influence
* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1966,
Radcliffe College; J.D., 1973, Columbia University. I thank Professor Randy Hertz and my
excellent research assistant, Susan J. Martin, for their creative and valuable help. I also thank
my colleagues in capital litigation for the insights and experiences they have shared with me over
the years. With regard to style, I use pronouns referring to gender interchangeably when I am
speaking in general terms; I also employ both "black" and "African-American" to indicate
members of that race.
1. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986). In McCleskey, which rejected a challenge to the entire death penalty system of Georgia,
claimed to function in a racist manner, LDF represented the prisoner directly. In other cases, the
Fund appeared as amicus curiae or (more frequently) "ghost-wrote" briefs, mooted oral argu-
ments, and furnished all kinds of informal assistance.
2. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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decisions on life or death both exemplifies and intensifies much that is
wrong with the death penalty in its real-world operation. 4 Though
probably favored by most victims' rights groups, this rule actually
amounts to a step backward for their cause.
In an idiosyncratic vein, I will also consider from a personal van-
tage the special meaning that victim issues and, in particular, the mur-
der's effects upon survivors have held for me. Discovery of this extra-
professional dimension to my capital work has been an unexpected
offshoot of focus on these specific problems, which began as fortui-
tously as my overall entry into the field.
II. BOOTH V. MrARm AN: THE PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED
A. An Inauspicious Beginning
Unlike many of the legal defense and civil liberties organizations,
LDF does not make a habit of filing amicus curiae briefs. In death
litigation, for example, the lawyers usually provide help behind the
scenes to the prisoner's attorney or represent the defendant directly.'
Booth started out no differently. In November 1986, we knew that
the case was pending before the Supreme Court. We also knew that
the issue it raised-the admissibility at a sentencing hearing of facts
about the particular victim and her family beyond what had come in
earlier as part of the narrative of the crime-possessed the potential to
affect our clients greatly. While not posing the type of challenge that
risked destroying or radically altering capital punishment as a system, 6
the petitioner in Booth questioned an evidentiary practice that was ex-
tremely prejudicial and quite widespread and that might become uni-
versal if the Court placed an imprimatur upon it. 7 The Capital
Punishment Project, therefore, wanted to have some input into the
4. I confine my remarks to the role of victim impact evidence in capital settings and, there-
fore, do not comment upon its use or abuse in other contexts. See generally Booth, 482 U.S. at
509 n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)) ("our decision
today is guided by the fact death is a 'punishment different from all other sanctions'); see also
infra note 39.
5. See supra note 1.
6. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (attack on entire operation of death pen-
alty in Georgia rejected by Court); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (attack on death
qualification of jurors in capital cases rejected by Court, partly because its acceptance might
have required empaneling separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases).
7. In the mid-80s, before Booth, a few states expressly barred this type of evidence at
sentencing trials in capital proceedings. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-1.1, -1.2 (Michie
Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CIsM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(A)-(B) (West 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 982 (West 1986). Maryland, by contrast, made its admission mandatory. See Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498 & n.2 (1987).
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prisoner's brief in this very important case. I was assigned as the liai-
son to Booth's attorneys.
Unfortunately, Booth's defense team never saw eye to eye with
ours. Although many death-sentenced inmates' lawyers welcome ad-
vice and help from "the experts," especially before the Supreme
Court, others find our approaches intrusive and prefer to dispense
with our aid. (Counsel for Booth were themselves professional defense
attorneys.) Worse still, they did not completely cut off communica-
tions with our team until the eve of Thanksgiving break, just before
the brief's due date. Nonetheless, under the circumstances, we be-
lieved we had no choice but to file an amicus brief of our own. I
became its lead author.8
The pace of the next few days was frantic. A morning person, who
virtually never does serious work after 7 p.m., I stayed at my desk for
hours on end to meet the deadline and pulled my first all-nighter since
college. When I finally entered my bedroom at six o'clock the follow-
ing morning, at the very moment the alarm was ringing to waken my
husband, I felt both bedraggled and pessimistic. Yet life goes on, as
does death: the day after the filing of the brief, Texas executed Mi-
chael Wayne Evans. My attention turned to other matters and I
shortly moved back to Columbia Law School.
B. Booth's Factual Setting
My gloominess about Booth's prospects was grounded on more
than physical exhaustion or even the generally decreased receptiveness
to claims on behalf of capital defendants displayed by the Court in
recent years. 9 For one thing, the facts of the crime were very ugly.
8. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in Support
of Petitioner, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (No. 86-5020). I do not, however, wish to
exaggerate my role in framing our arguments, the substance of which I will discuss in connection
with the Court's majority opinion. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31. Others (principally,
Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam of New York University School of Law) provided invaluable
assistance. The same is true of the brief I filed in Ohio v. Huertas. See Motion for Leave to File
Brief and Brief of Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991) (No. 89-1944). Since Booth, I have been
involved, in a formal or informal capacity, in the three Supreme Court cases dealing with victim
impact evidence or related prosecutorial argument. These are Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991), Huertas, and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). I was not involved in
a fourth, Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), in which only a dissenting opinion treated the
issue. See id. at 395-98 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 63-
67.
9. After a virtually unbroken series of Supreme Court victories, death-sentenced prisoners
lost four significant cases in the 1982-83 Term. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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Two young men, Booth and a friend, had entered the home of an
elderly couple, Irwin Bronstein and his wife Rose (neighbors of
Booth), robbed and gagged them, then repeatedly stabbed them in the
chest with a kitchen knife. A son found the bodies two days after-
ward. ' 0
Further, aside from the killers' brutality, the circumstances of the
victims' lives tended to evoke an extra measure of compassion for
them while enhancing revulsion toward the defendants. As related in
the victim impact statement (VIS) read to the jury at the sentencing
phase of Booth's trial," the Bronsteins had been outstanding indivi-
duals with close ties to family and friends. 2 In addition, the son,
daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter interviewed for the report
narrated in detail the sense of loss, emotional pain, somatic symp-
toms, depression, anger, fear, and shock caused them by the horrible
murders. 3 The granddaughter also recounted how the crime had over-
shadowed her sister's wedding a few days later; 4 the son and daughter
made various comments expressing impatience with court procedures
and implying that Booth should be sentenced to death. 5
Bad facts, of course, hardly guarantee appellate defeat-particu-
larly in death penalty cases, which often present awful scenarios.' 6 Yet
Booth seemed a poor vehicle for us in another way as well, one that
resisted frank discussion in the briefs or oral argument. It was a
black-on-white killing, the paradigm of the "death-worthy" murder. 7
10. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98.
11. The complete VIS appears as an Appendix to the Booth opinion; it occupies more than
five pages in the U.S. Reports. See id. at 509-15. At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the
VIS as irrelevant and inflammatory. After losing the motion, in hopes of muting the effect of
the statement, he asked that the prosecutor read it aloud rather than call the contributors to it to
testify before the jury. The prosecutor accepted the suggestion. Id. at 500-01.
12. They were globally described as 'amazing."' More precisely, the document noted, they
'were extremely good people who wouldn't hurt a fly."' Irwin Bronstein was characterized as a
hard-working man; Rose Bronstein as "'a woman who was young at heart."' Id. at 499 n.3,
510, 514.
13. For instance, the daughter stated that .'she still cries every day' and '"that wherever
she goes she sees and hears her parents."' Among other things, the report described how, faced
with the task of cleaning out the Bronsteins' house and observing the bloody carpet, "'she felt
like getting down on the rug and holding her mother."' Id. at 512.
14. Id. at 500, 511, 514.
15. For example, the interviewer from the State Division of Parole and Probation (DPP)
wrote of the daughter: 'She doesn't feel that the people who did this could ever be rehabilitated
and she doesn't want them to be able to do this again or put another family through this."' The
son, on his part, opined that his parents 'were butchered like animals [and he] doesn't think
anyone should be able to do something like that and get away with it."' Id. at 508, 511-12.
16. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 79 n.7 (1987) (victorious defendant, an in-
mate serving a life sentence without possibility of parole, had been sentenced to death for incin-
erating a fellow prisoner with whom he had fought about opening a window close to their cells).
17. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87, 291 n.7 (1987) (discussing study,
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To acknowledge my concern that this irrelevant, invidious factor
could possibly influence a legal decision on a major constitutional
question is not to accuse the Court of bias. The Court has vacated
capital penalties in other interracial settings, and sometimes for race-
related reasons. 8 But the principal feature of the evidence at issue was
the emphasis on who the victims were, its invitation to visceral reac-
tion on their behalf over and above the predictable sympathy experi-
enced by normal human beings when confronted with the horror of
violent crime against innocent people. Like others, justices cannot
wholly avoid "racially selective empathy"'' 9 or the familiar psychologi-
cal tendency to feel a deeper measure of concern for a person who
resembles oneself. 20
I therefore feared the presence of invisible emotional baggage,
-whose extra weight might drag us down. I could only hope that the
case would, at least, possess the virtues of its defects-in other words,
that the very power of the VIS would strengthen our claim of its fun-
damental illegitimacy in the context of capital sentencing.
C. A Happy Ending
Indeed, five members of the Court, writing through former Justice
Powell, firmly rejected the Maryland Court of Appeals' incredible
assumed valid, by Professor David C. Baldus and others, showing that blacks who murder
whites stand greatest chance of receiving death); see generally Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28
(1986) (discussing risk of racial prejudice infecting capital sentencing proceeding in cases of in-
terracial violence). Payne, which later overruled Booth, would present an even worse example of
this genre. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99. There was also a wide gulf in social status
between the middle-class Bronstein family and Booth and his accomplice, who committed the
robbery preceding the murder in order to obtain money for heroin. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-
98. A conversation with a family member, who happened to be one of my students, revealed that
the victims had insisted on remaining in their changing neighborhood over the protests of their
relatives.
18. See, e.g., Ford v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 850 (1991); Turner, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice:
Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 708 (1989); Sheri L.
Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016,
1020 n.27 (1988); see also Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J.
420 (1988).
20. In the candid words of a Texas judge: '"When a white is killed, the whites are upset.
When a black is killed, the blacks are upset. When a homosexual is killed of course the homo-
sexuals are upset."' Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of Two Homosexuals,
N.Y. TtmEs, Dec. 17, 1988, at 8. See generally Hayes v. Lockhart, 869 F.2d 358, 364 (8th Cir.
1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) (prosecutor made personal appeals to
several individual jurors, referring to their own families, in order to promote identification with
victim's family), vacated for reconsideration in light of South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989). In reading the VIS in Booth, I know I felt a special pang stemming from the fact that the
Bronsteins and I shared an ethnic background. See infra text accompanying notes 207-21.
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characterization of the VIS as a "'relatively straightforward and fac-
tual description' of the murders' effects on the Bronstein family. 2'
This document, summarized above, actually contained numerous ex-
amples of three types of information referred to as "victim impact
evidence" (although only one variety fits comfortably under that
heading). The first consists of data about the personal qualities of the
deceased. Naturally, it is usually flattering or, if not, pathetic and,
thus, sympathy-evoking. 22 The second, aptly described by the name,
deals with physical, psychological, or economic repercussions on the
only victims left by murder: family and, less often, friends.23 The
third, opinions concerning the crime and the killer, generally amounts
to a call to execute the defendant. 24
With one exception-Justice Powell did not specifically address our
claim that proof of this nature invites jurors to base death sentences
on impermissible grounds like race21-the Court's opinion essentially
tracked and endorsed our arguments. LDF contended in its brief that,
21. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 (1987) (quoting Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098,
1124 (Md. 1986)).
22. See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(VIS gave "thumbnail sketch of the victim's difficult childhood and frequent encounters with
correctional authorities").
23. As stated by an official of Parents of Murdered Children and Other Survivors of Homi-
cide Victims: .'For any one person murdered there are at least 10 people who are affected."'
See Tom Gibbons, Victims Again, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 64, 67. See generally Katherine
Miller et al., A Group for Families of Homicide Victims: An Evaluation, 83 Soc. CASEWORK: J.
CONTEMrP. Soc. WORK 432, 432 (1985) ("These people become the victims of the homicide along
with the person murdered."); Off the Bench and Off the Cuff, Solace for the Families of Mur-
dered Children (interview by Hon. Marvin R. Halbert with Deborah Spungen, founder of
POMC, Inc., Parents of Murdered Children), PA. L. J.-Rap., Apr. 14, 1986, at 10 [hereinafter
Spungen Interview). In this essay, unless the context otherwise suggests, I use the word "vic-
tims" to indicate both the persons targeted by crime and those in a close relationship with them
(though, as to the latter, I also employ such terms as "survivors" and "family members").
24. The VIS in Booth also contained editorial remarks by its author. The DPP officer com-
mented:
"It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family members
that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a shocking, painful, and devas-
tating memory to them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful
that they will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the
memory of the brutal manner in which their loved ones were murdered and taken
from them."
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 500, 515 (1987). Justice Powell's breakdown of the kinds of
victim impact evidence, id. at 502, differs slightly, but not in important respects, from mine.
25. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). In Booth, Justice White, who dissented,
noted in passing: "[Tlhere is no showing that the statements in this case encouraged this, nor
should we lightly presume such misconduct on the jury's part." 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). The majority opinion did treat the broader issue of discrimination
among victims, of which the race claim formed a part, see infra note 31 and accompanying text,
as well as alluding generally to the risk of relying on constitutionally forbidden or wholly irrele-
vant factors. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
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for several related reasons, victim impact evidence violates the Eighth
Amendment ban on practices creating an unacceptable risk of arbi-
trariness in capital punishment. 26
For one thing, by venturing beyond the traditional inquiry into the
defendant's character and record and the circumstances of the of-
fense,27 this kind of evidence introduces into the sentencing determina-
tion factors lacking any rational bearing on the acknowledged goals of
the penalty: retribution and deterrence.28 In addition, on account of
its highly inflammatory nature, such information subverts the rea-
soned decision-making process required for the imposition of death;
that problem especially afflicted the egregious "emotionally-charged
opinions" regarding the conclusions the jury should draw from the
proof in Booth's case.29 Then, too, it opens the door to reciprocal
evidence in rebuttal-and, thereby, to "It]he prospect of a 'mini-trial'
on the victim's character." 30 Finally, victim impact evidence tends to
produce sentences grounded on the victim's or her family's perceived
social or moral worth, a result the Court deemed disturbing since it is
not only capricious but also invidious and discriminatory. 3'
26. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Throughout this piece, I draw-usu-
ally without attribution-on briefs I have written or co-authored.
27. See, e.g., Stephens, 462 U.S. at 879; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
28. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-06 (1987); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 1 am phrasing the argument in the terms used in
LDF's brief. The Court, in speaking of the need for the penalty inquiry to focus on the defen-
dant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt," see infra text accompanying note 41, was es-
sentially saying the same thing. Earlier decisions had made clear that both the retributive and the
deterrent efficacy of capital punishment hinge critically on these factors-especially on the de-
fendant's intent. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799-801. These factors, in turn, are built into a death-
selection standard revolving around the offender and the offense.
29. 482 U.S. at 508-09. See supra notes 15 & 24. Justice White tacitly conceded the impro-
priety of this evidence but stated: "ITIhat is obviously not an inherent fault in all victim impact
statements and no reason to declare the practice of admitting such statements per se unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 518-19 (White, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, as subsequent cases were to reveal,
"kill the defendant" testimony, overt or veiled, surfaces often enough in connection with evi-
dence about the family's loss and the victim's virtues to raise suspicion that once the latter is
admitted at trial, the former tends to creep in as well-along with other types of misconduct.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 92, 98-99.
30. 482 U.S. at 506-07. The majority also expressed concern over the problems with coun-
tering evidence of family suffering: "Presumably the defendant . . . rarely would be able to
show that the family members have exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emo-
tional trauma suffered." Id. at 506. Justice White, predictably, responded along the lines of
"tough luck." If a defendant (like Booth, in this case) made no rebuttal, this is "probably
because he considered, wisely, that it was not in his best interest to do so." Id. at 518 (White, J.,
dissenting). Under the circumstances, wrote Justice White, the defendant should not be heard to
complain of the results of his tactical decision. Id. at 518 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
31. In regard to the latter point, Justice Powell wrote: "We are troubled by the implication
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Before examining in greater detail some of the issues involved in
Booth,32 a task more profitably undertaken following treatment of the
dissents and a synopsis of later decisions,33 I want to stress that the
Court's holding jibed with traditional rules of evidence. This fact war-
rants mention because of the penchant of many of Booth's vocal de-
tractors, both on and off the Court, to paint its principle as
outlandish rather than simply incorrect.
Clearly, express or implied opinions about what sentence a defen-
dant deserves fall well beyond the legal pale:3 4 "Questions which
would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are
not permitted." 5 Local law also routinely barred proof in homicide
trials of the victim's character, good or bad,3 6 as well as evidence of
family bereavement.17 Only recently has the passage of legislation al-
that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment
than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of course, our system of justice does
not tolerate such distinctions." Id. at 506 & n.8 (omitting citation to Justice Douglas's concur-
rence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
32. Rather than aim for exhaustive coverage, I plan to emphasize those issues most relevant
to a victim-focused critique of Payne.
33. There were two dissenting opinions. In one, authored by Justice White, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting). In the
other, written by Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice and Justices White and O'Connor joined. Id.
at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Payne v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 500, 506 (Va.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
933 (1987); Rodriquez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 710 S.W.2d 60
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987), affd after re-
mand, 930 F.2d 922 (1991); cf. State v. Rushing, 464 So. 2d 268, 275 (La. 1985) (error to admit
testimony that the killing was one of most vicious the policeman had seen since this was tanta-
mount to opinion that alleged aggravating factor existed), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
But see Romine v. State, 350 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987). Modern
statutes tend to follow the approach of the common law in this area, barring such opinions from
trial-type proceedings. See generally Rules of Evidencefor United States Courts and Magistrates,
FED. R. EvID. 704, advisory comm. note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (the Federal Rules of Evidence
preclude "admission of opinions that would merely tell the jury what result to reach"). Notably,
the Maryland Code forbids introduction of sentencing recommendations in a capital penalty
hearing. MD. CoDE ANN. § 413(c)(iv) (1987). See Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228, 1271 (Md.
1985) (Cole, J., concurring), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
35. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983). See also State v. Jiles,
142 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1966) ("no witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly
that a person is guilty or innocent").
36. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, No. 49613 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1985) (LEXIS, States
Library, Ohio File); Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 225 (Miss. 1985); Henderson v. State, 218
S.E.2d 612, 614 (Ga. 1975). At times, a particular trait of the victim may be relevant and, there-
fore, admissible to prove an element of the crime, establish a defense, or rebut an argument by
the defendant. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.lO (1987), citing FED. R. EVID.
404(a)(2) (prosecution may show peaceable nature of victim to rebut charge that deceased was
aggressor).
37. See, e.g., People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 288 (1984); see also Grant v. State, 703
P.2d 943, 945-46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (prosecutor's statement that manslaughter victim was
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lowing or mandating victim impact testimony or written statements
changed the landscape with regard to "good victim" or "sad family"
information. 8 Thus, while most of the prior rulings were premised on
non-constitutional doctrine, they do, at least, suggest the need for
skepticism about the validity of introducing this highly prejudicial
type of data into the sensitive capital arena.3 9
D. The Disagreement Between the Majority and the Dissenters
The principal analytical division between the camps centered on
their respective views of the relevance of certain resulting harms in
measuring "the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral
guilt.'. 40 and, accordingly, his or her punishment. While Justices
White, Scalia, and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized
the "personal responsibility" prong, correctly noting that the criminal
law frequently makes accountability or grading decisions turn on out-
come more than intent, 4' Justice Powell's contingent stressed the
survived by 11 -year-old daughter held to be harmless error); People v. Bartall, 456 N.E.2d 59,
72-73 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor's summation on victims' rights held improper but harmless, in part
because there had been "no presentation of irrelevant evidence about the grieving family");
Welty v. State, 402 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1981) (preference for non-family member testimony,
whenever feasible, to identify the deceased).
38. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991). A number of such statutes are
listed in Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228, 1260 n.3 (Md. 1985) (Cole, J., concurring). Notably,
even in the past decade, some decisional law, as well as statutes, see supra note 7, prohibited
proof of the victim's moral or familial worth in capital proceedings. See, e.g., Wiley v. State,
484 So. 2d 339, 348 (Miss. 1986); People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119 (II. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1220 (1985); Ice v. Commmonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861
(1984). Similarly, there have been cases banning negative evidence about the deceased, see, e.g.,
State v. Gaskins, 326 S.E.2d 132, 145 (S.C.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985), or evidence of
adverse effects on the relatives of the accused. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 373 S.E.2d 587
(1988); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1979).
39. See generally California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative dif-
ference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scru-
tiny of the capital sentencing determination."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-
05 (1976). But cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 347 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that death is different.").
40. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982)).
41. Thus, for instance, the law distinguishes between the would-be killer whose gun acci-
dentally misfires, missing the target, and the one whose bullet attains its target; the law also
differentiates between the speeding driver whose luck holds out and the one whose auto hits a
pedestrian. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(remarking that moral guilt is identical, whether or not any harm ensues); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & AusTiN W. Scor, JR., CRiNAL. LAW § 6.8(b) at 590 (2d ed. 1986) (accomplice is
liable for all natural and probable consequences of offenses aided); id. § 6.8(a) at 587-88 (co-
conspirator is liable for all reasonably foreseeable offenses committed by other conspirators in
furtherance of conspiracy). Indeed, if the driver in the second example is merely negligent rather
than reckless, he would likely commit no crime unless his behavior injured another. In many
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"moral guilt" parameter. The dissenters, therefore, argued that the
"full extent of the harm" caused by the murderer's actions could be
properly considered in the judgment on life or death.42 Conversely, the
majority held that whatever the pertinence of the "full range of fore-
seeable consequences" for liability in other criminal or civil contexts,
it is not germane in the singular setting of a penalty hearing in a capi-
tal case. 43
This discussion only scratched the surface of one of the most funda-
mental debates in criminal law: the relative importance of objective
results of a person's conduct, as opposed to subjective mental state, in
assessing the degree of culpability." Further exploration of the broad
issue far exceeds the scope of this piece. In addition, I believe such
examination would not be fruitful for present purposes. As previously
noted, the basic split among the justices hinged less on the general role
of harm in assessing guilt or punishment than on the kinds of specific
harms that bear on a reasoned moral response45 to the inquiry into
whether a defendant should live or die. The division over the latter
reflects divergent views about the propriety of the claims of victims
and kin at a sentencing trial and, more deeply, different assumptions
that can be made about their value as individuals.
Remarking that murderers rarely choose their victims in order to
affect a person besides the target46 and often are unacquainted with
the victim (and, hence, unaware of her family status), Justice Powell
expressed concern that reliance on a VIS could lead to imposition of a
death sentence based on factors "wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness" of the defendant.47 The majority, naturally, had to concede
jurisdictions, assuming the appropriate mental culpability, he would be guilty of reckless endan-
germent even in the absence of harmful results. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20, .25 (Mc-
Kinney 1987).
42. Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 504. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (minimum requirement
for death penalty eligibility is major participation in the felony committed plus reckless indiffer-
ence to human life).
44. For a comprehensive treatment of the topic by a scholar who places prime significance
on mens rea, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
45. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. But see, e.g., State v. Morales, 513 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1987) (murder committed as part
of revenge plot against victim's brother), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); Roberto Suro, Ver-
dict Is Guilty in Cheerleading Trial, N.Y. Timas, Sept. 4, 1991, at A18 (woman convicted of
trying to hire someone to kill mother of her daughter's chief rival in cheerleading contest, in
hopes that daughter of murdered woman would be too distraught to compete successfully). The
Court did not deny that the presence of such an unusually vicious motive would enhance a de-
fendant's moral guilt.
47. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987).
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that in some cases the killer will know beforehand information per-
taining to the likely effects the crime will have upon survivors and that
"a defendant's degree of knowledge of the probable consequences of
his actions may increase his moral culpability in a constitutionally sig-
nificant manner."4 Nevertheless, Justice Powell concluded: "We...
find that because of the nature of the information contained in a VIS,
it creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will
be made in an arbitrary manner." 49
The dissenting opinions best point up the major quarrel between the
opposing groups of justices. In the words of Justice White:
If anything, I would think that victim impact statements are
particularly appropriate evidence in capital sentencing hearings: the
State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating
evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in ... by reminding
the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an
individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents
a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.50
Justice Scalia emphasized the popular support for 'victims'
rights."' He noted that many "have found one-sided and hence un-
just" the appearance of a "parade of witnesses" to testify to the ex-
tenuating aspects of the defendant's character and background, with
no one to place upon the record "the full reality of human suffering"
that the defendant has wreaked on others."' He summed up:
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render
capital punishment a harsh penalty in the particular case be placed
before the sentencing authority, while simultaneously requiring, as
we do today, that evidence of much of the human suffering the
defendant has inflicted be suppressed, is in effect to prescribe a
debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty with one side
muted .52
48. Id. at 505.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
52. id. Given the distressingly poor quality of representation in capital trials, most defen-
dants have, at best, a trickle-not a parade-of witnesses in their behalf at the penalty stage.
See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Born-Again Death, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1987) (reviewing
WELsH S. WITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMNATION OF THE MODERN Sys-
TEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMNT (1987)). Of course, under the Woodson-Lockett line of decisions,
defendants have the right to adduce all relevant mitigating evidence. See Blystone v. Pennsyl-
vania, 494 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1990). Because Justice Scalia (alone on the Court) rejects the legiti-
macy of this branch of doctrine, see Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067-68 (1990), one
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The foregoing passages highlight the two entwined themes that lie at
the heart of the anti-Booth, now Payne, critique: first, the signifi-
cance of the victim's uniqueness, and second, the inequity of prohibit-
ing the same focus, at the punishment phase, on his or her qualities
and relationships as is placed upon the defendant's. The Booth major-
ity answered the challengers' points obliquely. Justice Powell initially
noted precedent stressing the need to treat the defendant as a
"'uniquely individual human bein[g]."' 3 In addition, he intimated
that attention paid to other claimants risked distracting the sentencing
body "from its constitutionally required task-determining whether
the death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record
of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime.' ' 4
The unfairness that troubled Justice Powell did not involve the tra-
ditional imbalance between the roles of defendants and victims at sen-
tencing trials; it involved a different kind of asymmetry that a revised
regime would spawn. This asymmetry would consist of the greater ex-
posure to execution facing killers of valued citizens or individuals with
vocal families, as contrasted with killers of miscreants or of persons
lacking articulate relatives." Equally disturbing, the new system would
also compel a novel and perverse form of "balance." For just as the
state would be permitted to call the deceased's kin to testify to her
upright character and the misery caused by her loss-so, too, "in ap-
propriate cases the defendant presumably would be permitted to put
on evidence that the victim was of dubious moral character, was un-
popular, or was ostracized from [her] family.'56
might ask whether he would tolerate "unequal time" for victims' advocates, if his position were
to prevail and limits were placed on defense efforts to individualize the defendant. In Payne, he
suggested that his answer was yes. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Eighth
Amendment gives the states broad leeway to decide "what constitutes aggravation and mitiga-
tion of a crime").
53. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
54. Id. at 507.
55. See Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1129 (Md. 1986) (Cole, J., concurring). Justice
White, as is his wont, see supra note 30, replied with the kiss-off that life is tough:
The Court's reliance on the alleged arbitrariness that can result from the differing
ability of victims' families to articulate their sense of loss is a makeweight considera-
tion: [nio two prosecutors have exactly the same ability to present their arguments to
the jury; no two witnesses have exactly the same ability to communicate the facts; but
there is no requirement in capital cases that the evidence and argument be reduced to
the lowest common denominator.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517-18 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). With regard to distinc-
tions among murderers based on the character of the victim, Justice White simply repeated his
basic premise: except for impermissible factors such as race, the state may "include as a sentenc-
ing consideration the particularized harm" stemming from the crime. Id. at 517.
56. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507; see generally id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting) ("no doubt a
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The ramifications of dwelling on the excellent personal traits or
community standing of the deceased or the pain and suffering of her
survivors have been alluded to before 7 and will be developed fur-
ther.58 But first I will summarize Booth's brief and troubled tenure on
the Court. Despite my strong emotional and intellectual investment in
the decision, I did not fool myself for long that it would endure the
onslaughts against it.
III. FROM BOOTH THROUGH PAYNE: THE PRINCIPLE ATTACKED,
EXPANDED, SIDESTEPPED, AND REVOKED
A. A New Justice-A New Beginning?
Booth was Justice Powell's valedictory; he retired at the end of the
1986-87 Term. While hardly a defense mainstay, Justice Powell had
become (together with Justice O'Connor) the swing vote on capital
cases during the eighties.59 His replacement by Justice Kennedy, a con-
servative from the Ninth Circuit, did not bode well for death-sen-
tenced prisoners.
One year after the decision in Booth, the Court handed down Mills
v. Maryland.60 Although the five-justice majority held for Mills on a
ground unrelated to the present discussion,6' the dissenters on that
capital defendant must be allowed to introduce relevant evidence in rebuttal to a victim impact
statement").
57. See supra note 31 and text accompanying notes 30-31.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 119-203. To be sure, a "good victim" and a "sad
family" typically correlate with each other. In the words of Justice Scalia: "I see no basis for
drawing a distinction for Eighth Amendment purposes between the admirable personal charac-
teristics of the particular victim and the particular injury caused to the victim's family and fellow
citizens. Indeed, I would often find it impossible to tell which was which." South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). These respective
types of evidence do, however, pose some issues warranting independent treatment-if only be-
cause a "bad victim" may also leave a grieving family. See infra text accompanying notes 176-
80. (In the words of a Georgia adage, even a snake has a mother.)
59. Between 1982 and 1987, when he retired, Justice Powell cast a crucial vote for the pris-
oner in these five-to-four decisions: Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and in judgment); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (majority opinion by
Powell, J.); and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). More often, his ballot was critical
to the state's victory. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (majority opinion by Pow-
ell, J.); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Cali-
fornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
60. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
61. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court vacated the death sentence because of the
substantial probability that reasonable jurors would have construed the judge's instructions, as
set forth in a verdict form, to bar their consideration of any mitigating evidence unless they
unanimously agreed on the existence of particular mitigating circumstances. This result would
have violated the Woodson-Lockett line of precedent. See supra text accompanying notes 27 and
52.
34 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:21
point were forced to address a second argument-that the trial court
had erroneously admitted statements regarding the deceased, Paul
Brown. Joined now by Justice Kennedy as well as Justices O'Connor
and Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the Booth contention
too.62
The disputed matter consisted of a written interview with Brown's
brother and sister-in-law. Brown had been Mills's cellmate; the defen-
dant stabbed him to death with a "shank" or homemade knife. 63 Un-
like the VIS in Booth, the memorandum here was short-a scant three
paragraphs-and contained only one type of victim impact evidence, a
"thumbnail sketch" of Brown's background and characteristics.6 No-
tably, it did not mention family grief or express survivors' views re-
specting punishment. It did not even praise the victim. Rather, it gave
the "barest of details" about Brown's difficulties as a child in foster
care and then as a runaway and inmate of juvenile correctional facili-
ties. In the words of the brother:
Paul was a good person who had a tough life, a lot of bad breaks,
no family, no home, nobody to really give him a chance. I sometimes
think he felt more secure in prison, because he had no one on the
outside. Sure, he committed crimes, but he wasn't violent. He did
what he had to do to survive and he got involved with a lot of bad
people. 6
In voting to affirm, the dissenters hedged. In part, they relied on
the sparseness of the challenged statements." More ominously, espe-
cially now that Justice Kennedy swelled their ranks, they asserted their
continued belief that they continued to believe Booth had been
wrongly decided.67 They did, however, stop short of a call for overrul-
ing Booth.
B. The Line Holds, and Inches Forward
Twelve months later, the same five-person majority, this time writ-
ing through Justice Brennan, clearly affirmed and slightly expanded
62. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice
White, who authored the principal dissent in Booth, concurred in Mills because he agreed with
the Court's disposition of the main issue. Id. at 389 (White, J., concurring).
63. That is all the majority opinion said of the crime. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 369. The
dissenters added nothing further.
64. See supra note 22.
65. 486 U.S. at 396-97 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
66. The Chief Justice remarked cryptically: "I do not interpret Booth as foreclosing the
introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder victim ... ." Id. at 398.
67. Id. at 397.
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Booth's holding in South Carolina v. Gathers.61 Gathers fell between
the two previous decisions on a spectrum of both the apparent hei-
nousness of the murder and the egregiousness of the victim impact
evidence.
As in Mills, the crime was intra-racial-though black-on-black, not
white-on-white-and the information in question pertained solely to
the victim's personal qualities. In addition, the deceased, Richard
Haynes, had been one of life's losers rather than a pillar of his com-
munity: an unemployed, self-anointed preacher with a history of men-
tal problems. 69 But as in Booth, the record revealed a murder of
extreme brutality. Gathers and his three companions had set upon
Haynes, a stranger, at a park bench when the latter declined to talk to
them. The four assaulted the defenseless Haynes with their feet, a bot-
tle, and an umbrella. They rummaged through his personal belongings
(mainly items of religious significance), vainly searching for some-
thing to steal. Some time later, the defendant himself administered the
coup de grace with a knife. 70 With respect to the victim-related matter,
the evidence was-unlike in Booth and Mills-oral instead of written,
and presented to the jury in the form of prosecutorial argument. It
occupied a midway position in both length and probable effect.
Specifically, the contested portion of the State's sentencing summa-
tion concerned two documents admitted at the trial on guilt or inno-
cence: a tract entitled The Game Guy's Prayer and a voter's
registration card. These were simply a few of the objects Haynes had
been carrying at the time of the crime, and neither had been read ear-
lier to the jurors or otherwise referred to in terms of content.71 None-
theless, at the penalty hearing, the prosecutor recited the lengthy and
sentimental prayer in full 2 and dwelt on the victim's religiousness. 73
The prosecutor also used the card to urge that Haynes had 'believed
68. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
69. Id. at 810.
70. Id. at 807. The defendant even inserted the umbrella in the victim's anus. Id.
71. Id.
72. The following excerpts convey its flavor:
"Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy
place in this lineup .... I only ask you for the stuff to give you one hundred percent
of what I have got .... And help me to take the bad break as part of the game. ...
Help me to be brave so that the harder they come the better I like it. And, oh God,
help me to always play on the square."
Id. at 808-09.
73. Included in the prosecutor's closing remarks was the following: '.Of course, he is now
with the angels now [sic], but this defendant Demetrius Gathers could care little about the fact
that he is a religious person."' Id. at 808.
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in' the Charleston community: 'He took part.'" 4 Simply put, in
defiance of Booth, the comments suggested that the defendant 'de-
served a death sentence because the victim was a religious man and a
registered voter. "'7
In a terse opinion, Justice Brennan not only endorsed Booth's cen-
tral tenets but also readily extended their purview to statements by the
prosecution, as opposed to surviving relatives. 76 He refused to widen
the loophole left open in Booth for proof pertaining directly to the
circumstances of the offense 7 to encompass the substance of the doc-
uments since it almost surely passed unnoticed during the frantic quest
for loot. The "purely fortuitous" nature of the papers, which had no
bearing on the decision to kill the victim, Brennan reasoned, could
furnish nothing relevant to Gathers' "moral culpability.' 5
In a separate concurrence, Justice White joined Justice Brennan's
opinion because he felt that "[u]nless [Booth] is to be overruled, the
judgment below must be affirmed." 7 9 Justice Scalia, in a dissent not
joined by any other justice, accepted this oblique invitation and issued
74. Id. at 809. Immediately beforehand, the State's attorney characterized the card as
'something that we all treasure."' He continued: "'Speaks a lot about Reverend Minister
Haynes. Very simple yet very profound. Voting. A voter's registration card."' Id.
75. Id. at 810 (quoting South Carolina Supreme Court).
76. Id. at 811.
77. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10 (1987).
78. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812. Indeed, even if Gathers had read the tract or the card, his
greater awareness would not have increased his blameworthiness-unless one thinks, contrary to
Booth, that murdering a person of known good character should serve as a basis for a sentence
of death. That conclusion would be particularly troubling here. The Court has stated that relig-
ious or political affiliations of the defendant (invidious as well as capricious distinctions) may
not constitute aggravating factors. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). By the same token, the ban applies to the use of similar
criteria in the case of victims. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (discrimination
in capital sentencing with respect to the victim's race would be impermissible).
But this prohibition should not bar heavier punishment for persons who knowingly choose
peculiarly vulnerable victims: for instance, high governmental officials, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
351 (1988), or elderly persons. See generally U.S. SENTENciNo GtIDELINES § 3A1. 1 (augmenting
sentence if defendant knew or should have known that victim "was unusually vulnerable due to
age, physical or mental condition"). These situations implicate special considerations of retribu-
tion or deterrence or both. Also, they typically rest on prior legislative judgments rather than
"ad hoc and post hoc" assessments by individual sentencing bodies of the loss caused by partic-
ular deaths. See Payne v. Tennessee, I ll S. Ct. 2597, 2629 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Leg-
islative identification-at least, in fairly general terms-should be required in capital cases of
those aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk of inviting unduly subjective or ca-
pricious reactions by the sentencer. But cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (facially up-
holding Georgia scheme, which permitted reliance on nonstatutory as well as statutory
aggravating factors). I would include under that heading the status or qualities of the victim.
79. 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J., concurring).
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the first unambiguous call to abandon Booth.8" Also dissenting,
Justice O'Connor, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy indicated
that they "st[oo]d ready to overrule" Booth, if the Court would do
so, but believed they could "reach a proper disposition" in Gathers
without resorting to such action.8'
In an effort to confine Booth to its purportedly "central holding"
barring proof at penalty hearings of harm to surviving family mem-
bers, 82 their dissent focused on salvaging a place at trial for the pri-
mary victim-the deceased person. Invoking the now-familiar themes
of victim uniqueness and the one-sidedness of a judgment based only
on the defendant's character and background, Justice O'Connor pro-
posed that the jurors be permitted to hear information on the victim's
"personal characteristics":"3
Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes the community from
considering its loss in assessing punishment nor requires that the
victim remain a faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital
trial. That the victim in this case was a deeply religious and harmless
individual who exhibited his care for his community by religious
proselytization and political participation in its affairs was relevant
to the community's loss at his demise, just as society would view
with grief and anger the killing of the mother or father of small
children.1
4
C. The Court Ducks
On the first day of the 1990-91 Term, the Court granted the State's
petition for certiorari in Ohio v. Huertas, another Booth-related
case.8" By this time, Justice Brennan had retired-to be replaced by
the enigmatic Justice Souter. Even without the expected additional re-
cruit to their ranks, the critics of Booth outnumbered its supporters;
80. Id. at 823-24 (Scalia I., dissenting). Discussion of his views on the claims of stare decisis
in the present context falls beyond the scope of this essay.
81. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Insofar as one can distinguish between evidence
about the victim's personal qualities and evidence about the familial harm resulting from his or
her demise, but see supra note 58, the former threatens the integrity of death sentence proceed-
ings no less than the latter. Thus, I believe they erred in their view of what was central to
Booth's concern.
83. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 819 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 821 (citation omitted). Having advanced the propriety of dwelling on Haynes's
religious and political conduct, Justice O'Connor, nonetheless, asserted: "It would indeed be
improper for a prosecutor to urge that the death penalty be imposed because of the race, relig-
ion, or political affiliation of the victim." Id. (emphasis in original); see also supra note 78.
85. 111 S. Ct. 39, granting cert. to 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990).
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the decision's viability depended wholly on Justice White's fidelity to
precedent. It appeared that we, as Huertas's advocates, would have to
hold on to Justice White's reluctant vote while persuading the new-
comer either of the merits of our position or of the virtues of stare
decisis. Yet in the end, we avoided both of those difficult tasks by
convincing an unknown complement of justices to dodge the issues by
dismissing the writ as improvidently granted.8 6 Rather than make bad
law for us, the case made no law at all.
The Court's ideological makeup notwithstanding, Huertas actually
should have been fairly easy to win. For one thing, the death sentence
was somewhat puzzling-except, perhaps, for the presence of victim
impact testimony. Resembling a heat-of-passion manslaughter more
than an aggravated murder scenario, the killing grew out a love trian-
gle involving Huertas, his sometime girlfriend Elba Ortiz (both His-
panics), and her current boyfriend, Ralph Harris, Jr. (an African-
American, later the victim). All three had been close since high
school. The fatal stabbing, committed in a haze of intoxication, oc-
curred after the defendant attempted to woo Ortiz away from Harris
and she replied that she was spending the night with Harris.8 7 While
hardly excusable, Huertas's act seemed comprehensible and neither
venial nor especially heinous.
Equally favorable to Huertas, the record contained, in oral as well
as written form,88 samples of all three types of evidence condemned in
Booth. In addition to praising her son's character,"5 the victim's
mother, Elizabeth Harris, described not only her own sense of loss but
also her grandson's: .'I hate to take him to the graveyard. He always
wants to go. He think[s] he [is] going to see his dad." ' 90 Although not
as extensive as similar comments in Booth, this "good victim" and
"sad family" information-conveyed in a plainly emotional tone-
86. 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) (per curiam). In various papers, Huertas mounted a strong claim
that his triumph in the Ohio court had rested on adequate and independent state law grounds.
See, e.g., Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 3 n.1, Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) (No.
89-1944); Motion to Dismiss Certiorari as Improvidently Granted, Huertas (No. 89-1944). Much
of the oral argument, too, revolved about arcane points of local law (as respondent's counsel
had hoped and planned). See Transcript of Oral Argument, Huertas (No. 89-1944). Although
the Court did not frankly dispose of the matter on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, doubts on
this score very likely influenced the course that was, in fact, adopted. See Tony Mauro, Com-
mentary: Courtside, MANHATTAN LAW., Apr. 1991, at 14.
87. See State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio 1990).
88. A pre-sentence investigation report summarizing an interview with the victim's parents
was introduced at the penalty phase, as was the witness's live testimony. Id. at 1062.
89. For example, she stated: .'Oh God, how proud I was, a child that never give me no
problem, no nothing, no drinking, no smoking, nothing but go to church and come back
[sic] .... ' Id.
90. Id.
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must have produced a poignant effect.91 Most egregiously, the State
called the victim's father to testify that he wanted the defendant to
"go to the chair." 9 That error, in itself, ought to have compelled af-
firmance,93 and it apparently constituted the main ground on which
the Ohio Supreme Court upset the sentence. 94
Finally, even if one had assessed Huertas's personal prospects as
poor before the Court, his case seemed a likelier vehicle for limiting
the rule of Booth and Gathers than for abolishing it entirely. The
question presented implicated the reach of these precedents, not their
existence: specifically, whether their ban applied to admission of vic-
tim impact evidence against a defendant who "intimately knew" the
deceased and his family and thus was aware of the trauma the murder
would probably cause them. 95 The State ultimately urged overruling-
yet only half-heartedly, in the alternative.9 Put simply, the more I
became immersed in Huertas, the less I could envision its sounding the
death knell for Booth.
I was, of course, correct about that. But immediately after the dis-
missal of the writ, I began to watch the advance sheets for signs of
91. Id.
92. See Joint Appendix at 146, Ohio v. Huertas, 11 I S. Ct. 805 (1991) (No. 89-1944).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
94. See State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d. 1058, 1065 (Ohio 1990).
95. See Ohio v. Huertas, III S. Ct. 39, granting cert. to 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990). 1 do
not believe, however, that a loss in Huertas based upon this factual distinction would have sal-
vaged much of Booth. Among other things, the foreseeability of harm to survivors known to the
killer does not provide a principled ground for admitting evidence about the virtues of the de-
ceased or, a fortiori, relatives' opinions that the defendant deserves to die. I am also doubtful
that, absent a motive to injure the family, see, e.g., supra note 46 (citing cases), the killer's prior
acquaintance with people who will predictably mourn the victim increases the former's moral
culpability. But cf. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987) (intimating contrary view),
After all, " [ejvery defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal re-
sponsibility .... that the person who will be killed probably has close associates, 'survivors' who
will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death'; judges and jurors know this, too.
Payne v. Tennessee, 11 S. Ct. 2597, 2630 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2615
(Souter, J., concurring)). For these reasons, coupled with the loss of the primary victim, society
punishes criminal homicide in the first place.
In any event, a decision in Huertas limiting Booth in the manner suggested would have raised
difficult practical issues about the precise amount of knowledge of secondary victims sufficient
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence. For example, should the fact that Booth may
have seen the Bronsteins' children and grandchildren once in a while at a distance have lifted the
ban on proof of their pain? Or if Mills's cellmate, Brown, had mentioned his brother to Mills,
should that have opened the door to proof of the brother's sadness when Brown was killed?
Given these problems, one would not have expected the Court to adopt a rule turning on such
hairline differences.
96. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 49-51, Ohio v. Huertas, I I S. Ct. 805 (1991) (No.
89-1944). Others, to be sure, preferred that course. See, e.g., Brief of Washington Legal Foun-
dation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Huertas (No. 89-1944) Ihereinafter WLF
Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Huertas (No. 89-
1944).
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renewed attention to the subject by the justices. Sadly, my interest did
not go "unrewarded" for long.
D. An Unhappy Ending
Four weeks later, the Court again agreed to hear a capital case rais-
ing issues under Booth and Gathers. Indeed, the Court reached out to
do so. Fishing in the certiorari pool, the justices hooked a petition
from hell. 97 Payne v. Tennessee98 involved a gory black-on-white mur-
der of a young mother, Charisse Christopher, and her two-year-old
daughter, Lacie, by the drug-crazed and sexually driven defendant.
During his frenzy, Payne inflicted forty-one knife wounds on Christo-
pher alone; he also attacked and almost killed her three-year-old
son-Lacie's older brother, Nicholas.
Clearly, this crime fell on the opposite end of the spectrum from
Huertas's "manslaughter-plus." It was the stuff of hideous night-
mares rather than romance gone awry and withered friendship. Capi-
talizing upon that horror at the sentencing phase, the State introduced
a color videotape of the gory murder scene featuring the corpses and
their wounds.9 9 The state also called Mary Zvolanek, Christopher's
mother, to testify to the reaction of Nicholas to these events:
"He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to
me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you
miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my
Lacie." 1°
This brief vignette, much less than appeared in the Booth VIS, com-
prised the sum of the actual evidence of victim impact. But as in
Gathers, the closing arguments served as powerful "testimony": not,
as there, to the victims' goodness but instead to the suffering of their
97. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
98. The facts of the guilt and penalty trials are taken from the Court's opinion in Payne,
Ill S. Ct. at 2601-03, and the opinion of the court below. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10,
11-14, 17-20 (Tenn. 1990). The Christophers lived across the hall from Payne's girlfriend, Bob-
bie Thomas. Payne had been visiting Thomas's apartment, waiting for her to return from a trip,
on the weekend when the murders occurred.
99. See Transcript of the Evidence, vol. 11 at 1489-92, State v. Payne (Crim. Ct. of Tenn.
at Memphis, Feb. 9, 1988) (Nos. 87-04408, 87-04409, 87-04410).
100. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2603 (1991).
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survivors, especially Nicholas. 0 1 Further, the prosecutor strongly im-
plied that a grownup Nicholas would wish to see the murderer of his
family killed: '[There is something that you can do for Nicho-
las .... He is going to want to know what type of justice was done.
He is going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you
will provide the answer." ' 0 2 Thus, the State essentially called on the
jury to sentence the defendant to death to satisfy the imputed desires
of an absent (and not yet competent) witness.
Unfortunately, from Payne's standpoint as a litigant urging consti-
tutional error, this pseudo-evidence was less blatant than the senior
Harris's testimony that Huertas should "go to the chair." 0 3 But from
the vantage of the Court's activists, Payne closely resembled Huertas
in one respect critical to them: the petition had not called into ques-
tion the continued existence of Booth and Gathers. (It hardly could
have, because the defendant had sought review.) Nor, however, had
Tennessee requested their reconsideration. Undaunted, and eager to
return to the fray, six members of the Court rewrote the application
for certiorari-ordering the parties to brief and argue whether Booth
and Gathers should be overruled. The justices also placed the matter
on an expedited briefing schedule so that Payne could be heard in
April during the final session of the Term" 4 Now, no knowledgeable
101. One of the two trial prosecutors poignantly portrayed a lonely Nicholas, whose
"'mother will never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing
him a lullaby,"' and who 'doesn't have anybody to watch cartoons with- him, a little one."'
Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2603. Toward the end of her summation, responding to the defense point
that Payne had led an "exemplary life" for 20 years (he had no prior criminal record or history
of alcohol or drug abuse, he worked with his father as a painter, and he had been a good son),
id. at 2602-03, she asserted that Christopher and Lacie had also lived "exemplary lives"; she did
not, however, elaborate. See Transcript of the Evidence, Payne, supra note 99, vol. 1I, at 1596-
97. Rather, she proceeded to stab a large diagram of Nicholas with the murder weapon while
saying "this is what [Payne] did to them." Id. at 1597; State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 20 (Tenn.
1990). The Tennessee Supreme Court condemned her conduct as "improper argument, an im-
proper, unprofessional act and an improper use of exhibits," but found that it was harmless
error. Id.
102. See Payne, I 1IS. Ct. at2603.
103. See supra text accompanying note 92.
104. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991); Linda Greenhouse, Court to Review a
Bar on Statements from Victims' Families, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 16, 1991, at 13. Justice Stevens,
dissenting with Justices Marshall and Blackmun, characterized the majority's actions as "both
unwise and unnecessary." Payne, I11 S. Ct. at 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also remarked
that, regardless, review of the claimed Booth error would be "inappropriate" because the deci-
sion of the court below rested on the alternative ground that any violation was harmless. Id.; see
also State v. Payne. 791 S.W.2d 10, 18-19 (Tenn. 1990). Notably, however, one of the prosecu-
tors told me at the oral argument that the State had not regarded a death sentence as a foregone
conclusion despite the hideous nature of the crime. This was because of Payne's good record and
his solid family background.
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observer could doubt that the days of the earlier decisions were num-
bered,105 with an endpoint of June or early July 1991.
For Booth's defenders, a further challenge arose from the fact that
the media hounds had scented blood-a circumstance compounded by
then Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's plan to argue before the
Court in support of the State and counter to Booth.10 The Attorney
General even adopted the unusual tactic of airing his position on tele-
vision talk shows. 07 We were, of course, at a disadvantage in sound-
bite debates on the complicated moral and social issues underlying the
legal questions (especially when attractive, articulate survivors added
their voices to the chorus against us).108 While these considerations did
not openly influence courtroom proceedings, they could not help but
cast a shadow over the oral argument in Payne.'09 To what extent they
may have subtly affected the newcomer, Justice Souter, we cannot
know.
105. See, e.g., Walter Shapiro, What Say Should Victim Have?, TM, May 27, 1991, at 61.
106. This was only his second such appearance before the Court. His first was in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), which upheld drug testing of rail-
road employees in certain situations. See generally Shapiro, supra note 105 (making tie between
Thornburgh's involvement and usefulness of Payne as political symbol for Bush administration).
107. See, e.g., Nightline: Victim Impact Statements (ABC television broadcast, June 10,
1991). available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni File [hereinafter Nightline]. After the argument,
he also held a press conference outside the Court. It is, perhaps, not overly cynical to speculate
that the Senate campaign which Mr. Thornburgh was plainly contemplating at this time may
have fueled his zest for media exposure. See Steve Daley & Christopher Drew, Thornburgh, Old
Foe May Try for Senate, Cm. Tam., Apr. 11, 1991, at 1. When Payne came down, Justice
Stevens commented sadly on the undoubted popularity of the course the majority had chosen.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Some of these, like Roberta Roper (the mother of a murdered daughter), have chan-
neled their anguish into a career of victim advocacy and have, thus, acquired great skill in public
speaking. Yet I felt uneasy contending with victims not on that score but mainly for psychologi-
cal reasons: my empathy made me feel protective rather than intellectually aggressive. Even
apart from such personal sentiments, one tends to pull one's punches for fear of seeming insensi-
tive and, thereby, "turning off" the audience.
109. Payne's counsel began his argument by trying to get the Court to focus on the appar-
ently least controversial, because apparently least justifiable, aspect of the state's conduct-the
imputation to Nicholas of a desire to see the murderer die. See Arguments Heard, Capital Pun-
ishment-"Victim Impact" Evidence, 49 Cans. L. RaP. 3033, 3034 (1991) [hereinafter Argu-
ments Heard]. If this maneuver was aimed at diverting the Justices from the divisive problems of
victim worth and effects on survivors, it utterly failed (although I do not fault the attorney). The
Court showed scant interest in the subject. Ultimately, piling insult on injury, the majority wrote
in a footnote in Payne that "[n]o evidence" of family members' characterizations or opinions
about the crime, the defendant, or the proper sentence had been presented at the trial in this
case. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2611 n.2; see also id. at 2612-13 (O'Connor, J, concurring); id. at
2614 (Souter, J., concurring). Although technically true because the challenged matter involved
argument rather than evidence, Gathers made such a distinction irrelevant. But if the Court just
meant to convey that it considered the claim meritless (possibly because the remarks were veiled),
it should have said so: Payne's contention was hardly frivolous.
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In any event, his vote was not decisive because Justice White joined
with him, the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy to bury Booth."0 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
penned an anti-Booth discourse-naysaying almost word for word the
arguments made by Justice Powell."' Justice O'Connor echoed him
briefly;"' Justice Souter, at greater length."'
For present purposes, I stress once more the critical division be-
tween the now-majority camp and the dissenters: their disagreement
over the need for the victim to play a personal role at the sentencing
phase to ensure both recognition of the singular loss caused by her
death and parity with the defendant's treatment as a quintessential hu-
man being. On the one hand, the Court's opinion spoke of Booth's
110. The nine members of the Court produced six opinions in the case. See Payne, Ill S. Ct.
2597 (1991); id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2613 (Scalia, J. concurring); id. at
2614 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2625 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Virtually all of Justice Scalia's concurrence and Justice Marshall's dissent were de-
voted to the issue of stare decisis, as were parts of the majority opinion and Justice Souter's. See
id. at 2609-11; id. at 2617-19 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's jeremiad on this subject
became his swan song: on the day that Payne came down, he announced his intent to resign
from the Court. See Michael Kranish, Marshall To Retire from High Court; Great-grandson of
Slave a Civil Rights Architect, BosToN GLoaE, June 28, 1991, at 1. He has since done so. See
Richard Berke, Thomas Vote Delayed Until Tuesday, N.Y. Tnas, Oct. 2, 1991, at A20. The
unusual force and bitterness with which he expressed his views, as well as the fact that they
constituted his parting thrust, ensure that others will give them their deserved attention. The
arguments about precedent, however, exceed the purview of this Article.
111. See generally text accompanying notes 25-31, 44, 46-49, 53-56 (summarizing Court's
opinion in Booth). By embodying the substance of prior dissents, Payne simply projects a re-
verse image of Booth. Because I have canvassed both sides' basic contentions in reviewing the
earlier cases, I will not repeat them here.
112. She focused on the theme of the victims' uniqueness: "'Murder is the ultimate act of
depersonalization .... It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse,
thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not
preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back."' Payne, I 11 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
113. His turgid opinion dwelt primarily on the general foreseeability (and hence, in his view,
moral relevance) of consequential harms to survivors. See supra note 95. He also went off on a
singular detour, arguing that-because much victim impact evidence comes in with respect to
guilt-phase issues-Booth's objective will not be met without requiring the seating of a separate
sentencing jury. He concluded that this ostensibly vital measure would too gravely impose on the
states to warrant retaining the rule of Booth. See Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2617
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring). But Justice Souter's dilemma is false. Evidence germane to guilt
or innocence will be admitted, possibly subject to limiting instructions, for the jury to consider
in that context. At the penalty phase, the same jurors can hear the case; and the prosecution, as
Gathers held, see supra text accompanying notes 77-78, will simply be forbidden to use the proof
pertaining to victims for ends unrelated to the grounds for admission. Further, to the extent that
such proof "is routinely and properly brought to the attention of the jury," improper introduc-
tion of additional evidence along these lines may often amount to harmless error. See Payne, Ill
S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., concurring). As Justice Stevens correctly stated: "[Wie should not be
concerned with the cases in which victim impact evidence will not make a difference. We should
be concerned instead with the cases in which it will make a difference." Id.
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having "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial" by barring evi-
dence of the deceased's individuality while giving the murderer free
rein to offer proof of his own condition." 4 On the other hand, Justice
Stevens's dissent challenged the majority's notion of an appropriate
balance and equity in this process" 5 and ridiculed the claim that so
"obvious" a fact as the victim's uniqueness "requires [any] eviden-
tiary support." " 6
Ironically, the victims'-rights stance of the Booth dissenters, who
ultimately carried the day in Payne-though superficially honoring
the dead and their survivors more than Justice Powell's approach-
actually threatens victim interests in a number of serious respects.
This is particularly true when the deceased does not hail from central
casting: a stereotypical blameless victim with whom everyone can
identify. One might question whether, even at a symbolic level, the
Payne principle vindicates victims as cultural icons rather than (for-
merly) flesh-and-blood people." 7 At the very least, the rejection of
Booth will pose tangible problems for victims in the real-world setting
of capital trials.
IV. VICTIMS' RIGHTS, VICTIMS' WRONGS:"' WHY PAYNE Is BAD FOR
VICTIMS
A. Honoring Victims With "The Right Stuff"
Developing his argument against the propriety of demonstrating the
deceased's uniqueness, Justice Stevens captured the essence of why in-
formed concern for victims counsels a skeptical view of Payne:"9
114. SeePayne, II1 S. Ct. at 2607.
115. See id. at 2627-28. In general, Justice Stevens repeated the substance of the arguments
made in Booth-most of which I will not recapitulate. See supra note 11; see also Payne, I I I S.
Ct. at 2620 & n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote response to majority's contentions by ref-
erence to Booth and Gathers opinions).
116. 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I will mention further arguments by mem-
bers of the Court in the context of my critique of Payne. See infra text accompanying notes 119-
202.
117. See generally Shapiro, supra note 105, at 61 (.'The significance of Payne is more socie-
tal in terms of what it says about the proper role of the crime victim in the criminal-justice
system."' (quoting lawyer for conservative Washington Legal Foundation)).
118. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985).
119. I do not claim that most professed champions of victims share this view. But victims of
crime and their survivors do not speak with a single voice. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File
Brief and Brief of Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Ohio v. Huertas, supra note 8 (survivors urge retention of rule of Booth and Gath-
ers); Marie Deans, Murder Most Foul, but Vengeance Kills the Soul, SAN Jose MERCURY NEWS,
July 17, 1983, at 4C (daughter-in-law of homicide victim founded group in opposition to capital
punishment); Henderson, supra note 118, at 938 n.3, 954-55 (author, a victim of violent crime,
criticizes much of current "victims' rights" agenda).
PAYNE AND SUFFERING
What is not obvious ... is the way in which the character or
reputation [of the victim] in one case may differ from that of other
possible victims. Evidence offered to prove such differences can only
be intended to identify some victims as more worthy of protection
than others. Such proof risks decisions based on the same invidious
motives as a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a
victim is white but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black. 20
Chief Justice Rehnquist purported to answer the criticism:
As a general matter ... victim impact evidence is not offered to
encourage comparative judgments of this kind-for instance, that
the killer of a hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death
penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does not. It is designed
to show instead each victim's "uniqueness as an individual human
being," whatever the jury might think the loss to the community
resulting from his death might be.'
He drew support for that proposition from the facts of Gathers,
which involved the killing of an unemployed, mentally handicapped
man-"perhaps not, in the eyes of most, a significant contributor to
society, but nonetheless a murdered human being."'122
The proffered examples, though hardly dispositive, do warrant
passing mention. First, the "hardworking, devoted parent" figures
more prominently in victim impact evidence and argument than any
other characterization I have seen in reported cases.'2 I doubt the
120. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
121. Id. at 2607 (emphasis in original). The internal quote appears to be taken (inexactly)
from Booth's quotation of language in Woodson. See id. at 2606-07.
122. Id. at 2607.
123. See supra text accompanying note 121. See, e.g., Hayes v. Lockhart, 869 F.2d 358, 363
(8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en bane) (prosecutor argued that victim
died his .'[nirst day on the job trying to support his family'), vacated, 491 U.S. 902 (1989);
Morrison v. State, 551 So. 2d 435, 439-40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (prosecutor argued that victim
was a "'hard-working woman in a family-run business"'), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911 (1990); Hill
v. Thigpen, 667 F. Supp. 314, 341 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (deceased portrayed as a .'good provider
and a good family man'), modified, 891 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1989), vacated, Ill S. Ct. 28 (1990).
The following excerpt from the state's penalty summation in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738 (1990), is a typical specimen:
Here you have a man twenty-four years of age, in the prime of life. A three-year-old
child. Holding down two jobs. Trying to make it in this world as an honest, law abid-
ing human being for his family. Trying to-aspiring to be a supervisor in another
county. ...
[W]e can look at what Matthew Shorter told us of his son. That he worked two
jobs. He had a degree from Alcorn University. He was striving to get a higher educa-
tion. And he had a son, a three-year-old son. .... And I think if you look at what he
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Chief Justice knew that, but it is interesting that he chose as an illus-
tration of "benign" practice so mined a pit of rhetorical ore. Second,
the remarkable thing about Gathers is the State's attempt to show that
this pathetic creature's killer deserved death less because of the weak-
ness he preyed on'21 than because of his target's religiosity and
claimed community spirit.1 25 In any event, if paeans to the deceased's
virtues are not aimed at inviting jurors to make some sort of compara-
tive judgments (whether among various victims or between the victim
and the defendant), 26 why do prosecutors never dwell on the dead
person's vices? That is hardly an idle question. Presumably, the fact
that one victim beat her children or dropped out of school in the ninth
grade would reveal her 'uniqueness as an individual human being'
as much as another's devotion to her family or graduation at the top
of her class. 27
Whatever the state's purpose, however, the predictable effect of re-
lying on such proof is that which Justice Stevens condemned: to en-
hance certain victims by identifying them as worthier than others of
society's highest measure of concern. 2 This stark truth reveals the
moral bankruptcy not only of the victim-uniqueness contention but
told you Arthur was doing, I think you can say that he properly instilled that work
ethic in Arthur.
Record on Appeal at 1192, Clemons (No. 88-6873), quoted in Motion for Leave to File Brief and
Brief of Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
in Ohio v. Huertas, supra note 8, at 37-38 n.14.
124. See generally supra note 78 (known vulnerability of victim may appropriately aggravate
sentence).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 and note 74. The prosecutor, therefore, tried
to the maximum extent possible to depict Gathers as a "contributor to society."
126. At best, this type of evidence encourages the sentencing body to choose up sides with
the usually more attractive victim and her family against the defendant-on the basis of the
former's greater "value" rather than, properly, the heinousness of the particular crime or of the
latter's general character. See Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 510 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1242 (1988); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1439 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Clark, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
During oral argument in Payne, the Attorney General of Tennessee answered a question by
Justice O'Connor about whether moral culpability includes the victim's characteristics by con-
ceding: "When they go only to the point of showing that the victim's life was worth more than
the defendant's, that's going too far." Arguments Heard, supra note 109, at 3034.
127. Notably, Professor Ilene Nagel, a United States Sentencing Commissioner who de-
scribes herself as .'very sympathetic to victims' rights' has indicated that she could not justify
making distinctions along these lines in ordinary (non-capital) sentencing. See Symposium,
Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 Am. CanM. L. REv. 1813, 1835 (1989), quoted in
Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRaM. L.
REv. 233, 249 n.87 (1991).
128. Rejection of such discrimination does not, of course, depend on believing that capital
punishment actually protects or vindicates lives to a greater degree than a sentence of imprison-
ment. In my opinion, neither retribution nor deterrence warrants imposing the death penalty.
See Richard Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for
Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1224-25 (1981).
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also of the hue and cry for parity with the attention paid the defen-
dant. When Justice Powell commented that "our system of justice
does not tolerate" invidious distinctions among victims,2 9 he was im-
plicitly invoking the single relevant notion of equality: the political
equality of all persons enshrined in the equal protection clause.3 0 By
inviting sentencers to calibrate the penalty to the personal or societal
value of the victim,' as they perceive it, the Payne principle turns the
concept of evenhandedness on its head.
Conversely, that ideal is in no way offended by the pre-Payne focus
on the killer alone. Apart from the fact that the criminal procedural
guarantees in the Bill of Rights do not incorporate a theory of state-
individual balance,3 2 in the particular setting at issue (the sentencing
phase of a capital trial) the prosecution can "counteract[] the mitigat-
ing evidence'1 3  by specific rebuttal, where this is available, 3 4 and by
129. See supra note 31.
130. Because of the modern emphasis on the anti-discrimination component of the Four-
teenth Amendment (referred to originally as a prohibition on drawing lines on the basis of
"class" or "caste" or "race"), many people do not know that the phrase "equal protection of
the laws" also requires the states to safeguard everyone's lives, liberty, and property, to the same
full extent, against criminal or tortious invasions. With regard to the former, see, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 537 (1866) (Rep. Stevens) (race); id. at 674 (Sen. Sumner) (race); id.
at 704 (Rep. Fessenden) (caste); id. at 1095 (Rep. Hotchkiss) (class); id. at 1227 (Sen. Sumner)
(caste or color); id. at 2766 (Sen. Howard) (class); id. at 3035 (Sen. Henderson) (race). With
regard to the latter, see, e.g., id. at 1225 (Rep. Wilson) (State that does not accord these protec-
tions to "all men violates its duty, because every person has this due him for his allegiance to the
Government"); id. at 1182 (Rep. Pomeroy) (everyone should have law's safeguards "weighed
out in equal and exact balances"); id. at 1094 (Rep. Bingham) ("all men are equal in the rights
of life and liberty before the majesty of American law"). See generally Jacobus ten Brock,
EQUAL UNDER LAW (1951) (detailing history and meaning of "equal protection of the laws").
131. Sentencers may also be led to consider, illegitimately, the worth of the spokespersons
for the deceased -her family and friends. See supra notes 55, 126.
132. See Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For ex-
ample, the state must prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the accused may
remain silent and adduce no evidence at all. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) with
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). The defendant may seek a new trial if she is con-
victed; the prosecution may not retry her if she is acquitted. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896) (setting forth both rules). This constitutional "tilt," in part, reflects the reality
that governments have vastly superior resources at their command and, therefore, do not begin
on an even plane with defendants. See Abraham Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). Notably, too, the Court has
often repeated (if not honored) the doctrine that although a sentencer's discretion to impose the
death sentence must be carefully cabined, "'the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a
sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the
death sentence."' McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1234 (1990) (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (emphasis in original)).
133. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
134. See, e.g., State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 n.2 (Ohio 1990) (state challenged
defense evidence that Huertas was a good father by eliciting testimony from his wife that he
never paid child support).
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proof of aggravating factors, which it must introduce regardless.'35
The prescribed "debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty"
occurs not "with one side muted," as Justice Scalia alleged in
Booth, 136 but rather with both sides arguing about the one individual
whose future hinges on the outcome.' 37 Such a proceeding is no more
skewed than a funeral centered on the deceased. In contrast, the post-
Payne toleration of witnesses to the victim's life being permitted to
share a podium with witnesses to the defendant's life produces a su-
perficial symmetry pleasing to the public eye, yet out of place in the
idiosyncratic moral construct of the modern sentencing trial.
In the passage quoted from Justice Stevens's dissent in Payne," he
obliquely raises the subject of race-the topic evaded by the Booth
majority, 3 9 which ought to figure in any discussion of the problems
with victim impact evidence. Even more troubling than death sen-
tences that are entirely arbitrary, in the sense that a strike of lightning
is freakish,' 40 are those imposed on invidious grounds. When the per-
sonal worth of the killer's target operates as the lightning rod,
caprice 14 combines with discrimination 42 to make the result doubly
disquieting. But when an institution of justice fosters either overt or
hidden use of constitutionally forbidden criteria such as race, social
standing, religion, or sexual orientation, it cannot be defended as just.
Unfortunately, the type of proof sanctioned by Payne risks enlarging
the role of this kind of consideration in capital penalty determina-
tions.
Reported decisions, in addition to Gathers, already reveal egregious
examples of attempts to exploit the victim's piety. 143 The prosecution
135. See Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
137. Cf. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (fairness argument is "classic non
sequitur" because the victim is not on trial).
138. See supra text accompanying note 120.
139. See supra text accompanying note 25.
140. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
141. See Payne v. Tennessee, I llS. Ct. 2597, 2629-30 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Cf, Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640, 653 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1983) (Kravitch, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (invoking "spectre" of statute listing as aggravating factor that "vic-
tim of the murder was a valuable member of society and of her family"), on reh'g en banc, 809
F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
143. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1991) (prosecutor mounted life-size
photo of victim in full military uniform and stressed that he had been army chaplain); State v.
Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990) (victim's mother mentioned son's churchgoing habits);
Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 962 (5th Cir. 1983) (witness testified that deceased was choir mem-
ber at his church), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984); cf. People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119,
134-35 (Ill. 1984) (prosecutor dwelt on 'religious moral fiber' of victim's mother), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985). Remarking on the similar strategy in Gathers, the LDF amicus brief
noted: "It is not unduly cynical to suggest that none of this would have occurred had the victim
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is, of course, unlikely to argue explicitly that the murderer deserves
death because the deceased had money or status or was white.'" Yet
characteristics like the articulateness of survivors frequently correlate
closely with wealth and social position, thereby serving as surrogates
for parameters nobody deems appropriate. So, too, victim attributes
urged by the state, such as being a steady and dependable employee'45
or 'a good provider,"' 1'  import a certain community status, as well
as purely personal traits.'
7
Much worse, however, from the vantage point of particular survi-
vors than sentencing trials revolving about the deceased's virtues'" are
ones that, in the post-Payne world, will either ignore devalued victims
or, worst of all, provide a forum for airing their defects. In the course
of discussing these issues, immediately below, I will also elaborate on
the special problem of minority victims-above all, African-Ameri-
cans-who, as second-class citizens generally, predictably become sec-
ond-class victims.
B. Dishonoring Victims With "The Wrong Stuff"
The Booth majority raised the specter that sanctioning victim im-
pact evidence would logically entail admitting similar proof in re-
adhered to non-orthodox religious views, and had in his possession not an angel, a bible, and the
Game Guy's Prayer, but a voodoo doll, a satanic tract, and a blessing written by the Ayatollah
Khomeini." Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and
the American Jewish Congress, at 60, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 88-
305).
144. By contrast, because Americans accord unambivalent esteem to religious devotion or its
appearance, prosecutors show no hesitation in extolling the pious nature of victims. (I cannot,
for instance, remember a presidential candidate who professed to atheism or agnosticism.) But
cf. supra note 143 (suggesting that people do not respect cults or non-traditional religions).
145. See Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 510 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1242 (1988).
146. See Payne v. Tennessee, I l I S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991).
147. In Huertas, the Washington Legal Foundation claimed that the facts of the case at bar
proved that jurors exposed to victim impact evidence can, nonetheless, impose death even "when
the victim is not wealthy or socially prominent." WLF Brief, supra note 96, at 12. But caste and
class are relative concepts. The type of evidence and argument in question does not redound only
to the benefit of murdered members of the Rockefeller clan or of the leading family in town.
Rather, it serves more broadly to separate the "sheep" from the "goats," the socially acceptable
from the marginal or outcast elements of society. In any event, I do not contend that such
information invariably taints the sentencing process but simply that it has the pernicious ten-
dency to heighten the influence of invidious factors. Some have urged that it may, to the con-
trary, "personalize the victim for the jurors" in a way that makes it more probable that they will
empathize with survivors with whom they might otherwise feel they have very little in common.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Huertas, supra note 96,
at 15 n.7. While such an effect may occur occasionally (surely, no one can prove the opposite),
experience counsels that it is more likely to tip the balance in favor of death when it pertains to
"folks like us," from the perspective of the jurors. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
148. For discussion of the reasons why certain survivors prefer to bury, not praise, their
dead and, hence, do not want to come to court even to discuss their loved one's goodness, see
infra text accompanying notes 186-202.
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sponse and, thus, inviting "a 'mini-trial' on the victim's character."'' 49
Such a prospect is "more than simply unappealing" or potentially dis-
tracting to the jury, as the Court's opinion noted. 150 By leading ineluc-
tably to critical scrutiny of past lives, the Payne rule will allow the
most profound insult-decimation of the victim's memory"'5 -to be
added to the ultimate injury, death. Furthermore, departure from
Booth will harm not only specific individuals but also victims as a
group by encouraging sentencers to base their penalty determinations
on factors like race and societal standing.
Justice White underestimated the expansive scope of evidence that
an anti-Booth regime would yield. The dissent, while conceding the
defendant's undoubted right to adduce "relevant evidence in rebut-
tal, "' a seemed to consider this possibility quite remote. The White
opinion focused on the situation presented: a penalty hearing at which
the prosecutor offered proof of the victim's virtues and the suffering
endured by the family. Surmising that Booth himself had refrained
from attempting to challenge the VIS for tactical reasons-presuma-
bly, from fear of offending the jurors"3 and on account of its obvious
truth-the dissenters failed to address the very different situation of
the tarnished victim: the person whose "uniqueness" as a human be-
ing the state's attorney will likelier seek to suppress than tout.
In a nutshell, although few defense counsel may have the temerity
to assail the Bronsteins or their survivors, more will surely dare to
attack the drunk, addicted, insane, unorthodox, friendless, immoral,
or criminal victim. It is precisely when a victim's life has not been
blameless that the defense will try to impugn it. What Booth's oppo-
nents did not appreciate is that the same principle of relevance that
makes a victim's personal, familial, and social worth pertinent evi-
dence in aggravation makes his or her worthlessness in these respects
pertinent evidence in mitigation "in the sense that [it] might serve 'as
a basis for a sentence less than death." ' 15 4 The Payne principle not
only allows defendants to counter proof of a victim's good character
and of family members' grief with evidence and argument that the
deceased was, in truth, neither good nor grieved; it also allows defen-
149. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 55-56; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
150. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987).
151. See WILLARD GAYLIN, THtE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 15 (1983) (author stresses im-
portance of leaving "immortality of memory" intact).
152. 482 U.S. at 518 (White J., dissenting).
153. Id. at n.3.
154. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)).
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dants to place the character of a victim on trial even if the prosecution
did not."'
Thus, besmirching the deceased's memory whenever feasible has
now become an unavoidable, even if highly distasteful, duty of de-
fense attorneys. 5' Lawyers might risk being held ineffective unless
they endeavor to show "that the victim was of dubious moral charac-
ter, was unpopular, or was ostracized from [her] family."'15 7 Lest the
reader suspect that I am painting in overly garish colors an advocate's
portrait of a conjectural parade of horrors, consider the claim ad-
vanced by the Washington Legal Foundation in its Huertas amicus
brief to demonstrate the supposed fairness and evenhandedness of the
anti-Booth approach: "An individual convicted of murdering a drug
dealer, for example, could make a reasonable claim in mitigation that
his act actually benefitted society by ridding the community of a mer-
chant of violence and death."' 8 I would have thought that only
Charles Bronson or Clint Eastwood could rejoice at such a prospect!
155. This conclusion follows from constitutional doctrine that a defendant may not be pre-
vented from offering evidence relevant to the issues in a criminal trial. See Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The same rule applies at a capital sentencing hearing. See Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
156. See, e.g., Georgia Sargeant, Victim Impact Testimony Allowed by Supreme Court in
Death Penalty Hearings, TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at 19, 85 (quoting past president of South Carolina
Trial Lawyers' Association, who represents only capital defendants: "If [victim impact evidence
is] admitted and I have to undermine the victims' credibility to protect my clients, I will. It's ugly
and I don't want to, but I'll do whatever I have to do."). The temptation to smear crime victims
is ever-present in criminal trials, whether legally sanctioned or not, because such tactics are often
effective in gaining acquittals. Bobbie Lee Cook, a well-known lawyer who has represented more
than 350 murder defendants, describes the jurors' concerns as follows: .'Number one, should
the victim have been killed? Did he deserve to die? . . . And secondly, was your man the right
man for the job?"' Mark Curriden, Bobbie Lee Cook-Georgia Maverick, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1989, at 68.
The put-the-victim-on-trial technique operates, of course, in other contexts as well as mur-
der-most notably, in rape prosecutions-and has produced a vast literature. See, e.g., Vivian
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLum. L. Rav. 1
(1977) (focusing on admission of evidence of victim's prior sexual acts); cf. Joan L. Brown,
Note, Blaming the Victim: The Admissibility of Sexual History in Homicides, 16 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 263 (1988) (describing tendency to blame female homicide victims on account of their sexual
activity).
157. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987). Indeed, in this new regime, a prosecutor
would presumably incur a duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), to provide the defendant with information of potential use in
attacking the victim, although irrelevant to guilt or innocence. Cf. supra note 36 (victim's traits
may sometimes be relevant to a particular charge or defense).
158. WLF Brief, supra note 96, at 17 (emphasis in original). In response to questioning dur-
ing oral argument in Payne, the Attorneys General of both Tennessee and the United States
opined that defendants should not be allowed to denigrate victims. Arguments Heard, supra
note 109, at 3034-35. Unlike the Washington Legal Foundation, they failed to realize that
Booth's abandonment would demand reciprocal rejection of rules of evidence protecting victims.
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In sum, by inviting lawyers "to argue the victim's worthlessness in
mitigation,"'5 9 Payne ill serves the needs of victims while debasing the
dignity of the process. Its new and perverse balance of irrelevance'
60
hardly advances the ideal of parity extolled so highly by Booth's de-
tractors. To the contrary, as I have noted, it exacerbates inequalities
that subvert reliability in the determination of sentences.
Earlier, I mentioned prosecutors' efforts to enhance victims on the
basis of class and caste.1 6' Now I turn to the flip side of the situation:
evidence and argument by defendants, designed to smear or disparage
victims on these and other invidious grounds (as well as, in a related
vein, the system's often more casual treatment of dases involving
black victims). As opposed to particularized, haphazard denigration
of targets of crime, which injures individuals or their memories, at-
tacks founded on status factors (and similarly rooted insensitivity or
neglect) harm society as a whole. In many communities, perhaps all,
appeals to group-based animosities frequently fall on receptive ears.
Not surprisingly, the sensitive and volatile setting of a murder prose-
cution provides opportunities to capitalize on such divisions in espe-
cially damaging ways.
Although perhaps most widely acknowledged with respect to race, 62
the phenomenon of certain wrongs being taken less seriously because
of who the victim is also occurs in relation to other variables. For
instance, religious and political dissidents, gay people, homeless drif-
ters, prostitutes, and drug addicts may not be regarded as true vic-
tims,' 63 or their assailants as real criminals, by judges and jurors from
(typically) white and middle-class backgrounds. One trial judge una-
bashedly admits that he sentences according to the victim's perceived
societal worth. Explaining why he had imposed a relatively lenient
term on a man who killed two homosexuals, he stated: "'I put prosti-
159. See Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640, 653 n.4 (I1th Cir. 1983) (Kravitch, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), on reh'g en banc, 809 F.2d 702 (1ith Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1054 (1987).
160. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, I II S. Ct. 2597, 2625-26 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (even-
handed justice requires that both prosecution and defense be denied the use of irrelevant evi-
dence of victim's character).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 138-47.
162. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 20.
163. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, No. 49613 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1985) (LEXIS, States
Library, Ohio file) (defendant unsuccessfully attempted to introduce specific instances of de-
ceased's homosexual activity); Henderson, supra note 118, at 951 ("[victims' are not prosti-
tutes [who have been] beaten senseless by pimps or 'johns,' [or] drug addicts mugged and robbed
of their fixes"). Even socially mainstream women who claim "date rape" constitute such a sus-
pect class. See SUSAN ESTRtCH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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tutes and gays at about the same level.., and I'd be hard put to give
somebody life for killing a prostitute.""64
For every similar opinion aired, an untold number of unexpressed
biases are available for counsel to exploit-if given the opening.
Payne, regrettably, furnishes both sides just that chance on a silver
platter. In the past, for example, conscientious courts prevented law-
yers from engaging in tactics such as those attempted by counsel in
State v. Butler.16s There, in order to tarnish the victim, a young white
woman, in the eyes of the jury, the defendant sought to adduce proof
of her social and sexual relations with African-American men. The
judge, appropriately, refused to admit this irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence. 66 But that option is now foreclosed.167
Frank appeals to racial prejudice by the defense or the
prosecution'" constitute less of a problem, however, than the perva-
sive devaluation of victims of color in potentially capital proceedings.
Summarizing the findings of a recent study of murder cases in one
judicial circuit in Georgia, a New York Times reporter wrote: "By
both prosecuting their killers more vigorously and tending more assid-
uously to their bereaved survivors ... the system places a premium
on white lives over black.' ' 69 The existence of gross disparities be-
tween the number of death penalties imposed for murdering whites in
contrast to blacks, in Georgia' 70 and elsewhere,' 7' has been docu-
164. Belkin, supra note 20.
165. 290 S.E.2d I (S.C.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 932 (1982).
166. See Brief of the South Carolina Public Defenders' Ass'n and the South Carolina Death
Penalty Resource Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 42-44, South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (No. 88-305) (discussing facts from trial record not contained in
reported decision).
167. While the court could, presumably, still bar him from making explicitly racial argu-
ments, see supra text accompanying note 78, it would likely have to allow evidence about her
sexual history in order to shed light on her "character." But cf. Brown, supra note 156 (urging
enactment of legislation extending protection of rape shield laws to deceased victims of sexual
crimes). Few attorneys would not manage to convey to the jurors the race of the men with whom
she consorted.
168. See supra text accompanying note 144.
169. David Margolick, In Land of Death Penalty, Accusations of Racial Bias, N.Y. TiMms,
July 10, 1991, at Al (discussing report on discriminatory application of capital punishment in
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit).
170. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 353-56 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing Baldus study of Georgia); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An
Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 27, 54-92 (dealing with Georgia, as well as Florida and Illinois).
171. See Michael A. Kroll, How Much Is a Victim Worth?, N.Y. Timms, Apr. 24, 1991, at
A25. In 1990, a government report reviewed and critiqued previous literature on the subject in
order to determine (as required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §
7001(o)(2), 102 Stat. 4181, 4392-93 (1988)) "if the race of either the victim or the defendant
influences the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to death." U.S. GENERAL AcCOUNT-
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mented in great detail; therefore, I do not belabor the point. For pres-
ent purposes, I emphasize only that the rule of Payne, which
encourages attention by the sentencer to differences among victims in-
stead of to their common humanity, will make a bad situation
worse. 172
Simply put, the anti-Booth regime goes far toward legitimating
rather than merely tolerating-which is bad enough' 73-the infliction
of death on racial grounds. Even apart from express or tacit negative
treatment of black victims or family members, any suggestion that
some lives count for more because their possessors were white (or pi-
ous or socially respectable or heterosexual) would necessarily imply
that others count for less because their possessors were African-Amer-
ican (or irreligious or disreputable or homosexual). At the very least,
Payne will tend to reinforce the widespread view among black citizens
ING OFnIcE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN oF RAcIAL DISPARITIES
1 (1990); see id. App. I (listing studies relied on). In pertinent part, the GAO Report concluded:
Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of evidence indicating racial dispari-
ties in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty after the Furman
decision.
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the likelihood of
being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who mur-
dered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who
murdered blacks [footnote omitted]. This finding was remarkably consistent across
data sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. The finding held
for high, medium, and low quality studies.
The race of victim influence was found at all stages of the criminal justice proc-
ess ....
Id. at 5-6.
Until September 6, 1991, no white prisoner had been executed for killing a black for approxi-
mately half a century. See David Margolick, Rarity for U.S. Executions: White Dies for Killing
Black, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 7, 1991, at I. For discussion of the often minimal concern shown for
the feelings of black survivors, see infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
172. See, e.g., Kroll, supra note 171 (under Payne, the words "'Equal Justice Under Law'
will have one meaning for those who kill upper-class white people and another for those who
murder poor whites, Hispanics and blacks"). Bryan Stevenson, a capital defense attorney, sum-
marized the problem as follows:
-Fifty percent of the people who are victimized by violent crime in this country are
black. Most of the people who are victims of violent crime and homicide in this coun-
try are poor. Those are not the people whose cases end up before sentencing juries in a
capital trial. You're already 11 times more likely to get the death penalty if the victim
is white than if the victim is black. So why do we want to legitimate that by then
allowing victim members or survivors to come into the courtroom and appeal to those
same basic class and race issues that have already made our system unreasonable and
unjust?
Nightline, supra note 107, at 9.
173. But cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (State's maintenance of capital
system with awareness of racist consequences would not violate equal protection, absent motive
to keep it because of expected effect).
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that the predominantly white system of criminal justice' 74 has dealt
them an unequal hand.'
71
C. Payne's Effects On Family Members And Other Survivors
I have not yet focused directly on the consequences to family and
friends of allowing victim impact evidence. It should, however, be ob-
vious that the now permissible vilification of deceased persons who
have led unsavory lives will hurt or embarrass the victim's survivors.
Drug dealers have mothers too, and sometimes fathers, fiances, or si-
blings, whose reactions to their deaths do not necessarily reflect socie-
ty's. 17 6 A murdered reprobate'77 may have loved ones who are as
devoted as those of a school board president. Even the murderer often
does; otherwise, one would not see capital defendants' relatives testi-
fying at penalty trials.
These associates of the victim will themselves be victimized by see-
ing the latter smeared in the courtroom and, perhaps, being forced to
participate as hostile witnesses in the destruction of her memory.1 7 1
Further, many will understand the sole purpose of this unseemly exer-
cise-to demonstrate that the person they mourn is not considered a
174. See, e.g., JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIAL.S: A NA-
TIONAL ROSTER 127, 142 (1989) (discussing lack of black representation among Georgia's elected
district attorneys and paucity of black Superior Court judges); Rorie Sherman, Is Mississippi
Turning, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1 (small numbers of black judges in Mississippi, Alabama
and Louisiana). Compare Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prosecutor's use of peremp-
tory strikes to remove black jurors on account of race is violation of equal protection) with
Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor's strategy for jury selection in
capital case was to "get rid of as many" blacks as possible via peremptory challenges); see gen-
erally Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1576-78, 1576 n.22 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (detailing racist
expressions and beliefs of jurors who sat on capital case).
175. See Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Bill Winn, Racism
Concern Is Nothing New in Columbus, COLUMBUS LEDGER-INQUIRER, Aug. 14, 1988, at B-I 1; cf.
Elizabeth Coady, When Life Is Cheap, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 16, 1991, at Bi, BIO (black
families and clergy in Atlanta organized Mothers of Murdered Sons because of perceived indif-
ference by white judicial system to the victimization of blacks).
176. Cf. supra text accompanying note 158 (WLF Brief's claim that murderer of drug dealer
could argue status of victim as mitigating factor).
177. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991).
178. See Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in
Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L.
Rav. 7, 20 (1987). In some cases, the bad character of the deceased will have come out at the
trial on guilt because it relates to a material issue such as, for instance, self-defense. See Mc-
CORMCK ON EVUDENCE § 193 (Edward W. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). But, as Justice Stevens said about
victim impact evidence generally, we should focus our concern on the cases in which it makes a
difference. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, repetition or elabora-
tion of the originally hurtful evidence can only increase the pain to survivors.
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"death-worthy" victim.' Regardless of their comprehension, how-
ever, gratuitous emphasis on the victim's negative qualities-particu-
larly when cast in terms of blaming the dead-threatens to intensify
the guilt that survivors often feel for not doing enough to protect their
loved one and perhaps prevent the tragedy. 180
As noted earlier, African-Americans constitute a special subset of
inconsequential victims. Official inattention to black families amounts
to a scandal in many communities. Elected local district attorneys,
many of whom regard high-profile capital cases as the surest route to
a judgeship, cater to certain bereaved relatives while ignoring or
slighting others. Not surprisingly, well-known whites attract prosecu-
torial interest; poor and obscure blacks do not. Thus, for example, in
the Chattahoochee Circuit in Georgia, the district attorney asked the
father of a white victim, a prominent contractor, if he wanted the
death penalty. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, the prosecutor
said this was all he needed to know. After obtaining the desired sen-
tence, he was rewarded with a $5,000 campaign contribution in the
next judicial election. 8'
Similar stories abound with respect to such favored survivors. 8 2 By
contrast, when the victim is black, the authorities often ignore the
family.'83 Frequently, parents, siblings, and spouses hear about the
179. In the eloquent words of Charlotte Williams (addressed to the analogous problem of
unwillingness to find defendants guilty of violent crimes against "bad" victims):
If the victim was involved in a crime at the time of his maiming or murder, does
that make justice less important? Should jurors refuse to convict even when the evi-
dence is overwhelming, because a black victim brought his fate upon himself, or be-
cause his life was useless or because he was "subhuman"? I don't think the victim's
loved ones would share that view.
Charlotte Williams, The New Jim Crow, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1991, at C8. See generally San-
dra S. Fox, Families in Crisis: Reflections on the Children and Families of the Offender and the
Offended, 25 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 254, 257 (1981) (mourning
process of survivors made more difficult when discovery of perpetrator confirms involvement of
dead relative "in illegal or unethical activities").
180. See M. Virginia Sprang et al., Psychological Changes After the Murder of a Significant
Other, 125 Soc. CASEWORK: J. CoNfrEr. Soc. WORK 159, 161 (1989); Kilpatrick & Otto, supra
note 178, at 16. Such guilt tends to affect parents of victims the most. See Rosemary Masters et
al., Helping Families of Homicide Victims: A Multidimensional Approach, I J. TRAUM.ATIC
STRESS 109, 119 (1988).
181. Transcript of Hearing at 38-39, Davis v. Kemp, Super. Ct. of Butts County, Ga. (Oct.
21, 1988) (No. 86-V-865) [hereinafter Davis Hearing); Clint Claybrook, Slain Girl's Father Top
Campaign Contributor, CoLUMaus LEDGER-INQUIRER, Aug, 7, 1988, at BI. The father also gave
$3,000 to the campaign for district attorney of the prosecutor who tried the case. See Davis
Hearing at 38-39.
182. See Transcript of Hearing at 67-69, 152-53, 155-56, State v. Brooks, Super. Ct. of Mus-
cogee County, Ga. (Sept. 12, 1990) (Nos. 3888 & 54604) [hereinafter Brooks Hearing].
183. See Nightline, supra note 107, at 10 (comment by Bryan Stevenson); Brooks Hearing,
supra note 182, at 177-78, 184-85, 199-200, 203, 205-07, 212-13, 221-22, 227-29.
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disposition of proceedings involving their loved one's murder in the
media or "from the street."'18 4 Needless to say, it is unlikely that state
attorneys or police officers ever consult those disfavored relatives
about the penalty they would desire. In the post-Payne world-where
prosecutors will have even greater motivation to woo the "worthy"
bereaved-the above-described disparities in treatment can only in-
crease, thereby fueling existing fires of racial resentment.'
Finally, most people, including supporters as well as opponents of
the rule of Payne, would likely acknowledge that a mini-trial on the
deceased's character may cause both reputational damage and familial
suffering when that character is less than sterling. But few victims'
rights advocates (many of whom strongly endorse victim impact evi-
dence) 8 " recognize its potential to harm survivors of the blameless,
not only the tainted.
Indeed, especially in cases of unimpeachable victims, prosecutors
will put pressure on family members to testify to their relatives' "out-
standing personal qualities' 8t1 7 and to the pain produced by the mur-
der. Although some witnesses might view the experience as cathartic,
others will not. 8' The latter may wish to avoid appearing in court at
all or, as to those who must take the stand at the hearing on guilt,
avoid reappearing at the penalty phase. Importuned by the state's at-
torney-and likely believing they owe the dead a duty to speak,
whether they wish to do so or not'89-vulnerable parents, children,
and siblings will have no real choice in the matter.
For reluctant participants,90 the need to dwell once more on their
loss can only lead to renewed hurt and impede the healing process.,,'
184. See Brooks Hearing, supra note 182, at 177-78, 200, 206.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
186. See Henderson, supra note 118, at 986; see, e.g, Nightline, supra note 107, at 9-12
(Roberta Roper); Spungen Interview, supra note 23, at 10 (Deborah Spungen).
187. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499 (1987).
188. See Henderson, supra note 118, at 979-80.
189. In the words of Dorothea Morefield, the mother of a murdered son: "[W]hat about the
survivor who cannot bear to go to the trial-who cannot face the judge or jury-who cannot or
will not cry on demand? Will they be made to feel guilty or inadequate? You better believe they
will." Speech by Dorothea Morefield at Conference of Death Penalty Litigators, Airlie House,
Warrenton, Va. 2, 9 (Aug. 3, 1991) (on file with author). A study of 1,182 families of homicide
victims in New York City reports that members are "often tortured by conflicting desires. They
feel they must attend the proceedings in order to see 'justice done.' However, the hearings are
usually painful for them." Masters et al., supra note 180, at 111, 116. See, e.g., Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496, 513 (1987) (victim's daughter attended trials of both the defendant and co-
defendant "because she felt someone should be there to represent her parents").
190. The record suggests that the mother in Huertas, for example, would have preferred not
to testify. See, e.g., Joint Appendix, Ohio v. Huertas, supra note 92, at 137 (in response to
emotional outburst by Ms. Harris at the sentencing trial, defense counsel conceded: "I know you
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Yet even survivors who are willing or eager to attend the proceedings
and lay their misery before the jury frequently find that they must
compete as victims with the defendant's family, mourning the possible
execution of a son or grandson, father, or brother. 92 Overmatched in
the pain-and-suffering derby, surviving kin who fail to "win" a sen-
tence of death will incur guilt.' 93 Dorothea Morefield, the mother of a
murder victim194 as well as a proponent of Booth, stated: "Victims
need help, they need consideration, they need understanding. What
they do not need are situations that add to their feelings of guilt or
inadequacy." 195 Paradoxically, however, for certain people winning
can prove as bad as losing. While desire for revenge may prevail in the
short run, the passage of time may diminish this longing: retaliation
might be the first, but not the last or definitive, impulse.'9 In that
event, the relatives whose victim impact evidence helped to procure a
capital sentence may come to regret that "they played a part in some-
one's death-something so totally unspeakable when it happened to
them."197
don't want to talk about it any more. ); id. at 162 (victim's parents stated to presentence
investigator that they were "tired of rehashing over [sic] the details and wished that people
would leave them alone"). Notably, the Harrises expressed the desire to be left in peace even
when interviewed outside court in connection with the writing of the VIS.
191. Repeated confrontations with the criminal justice system "disrupt[] the working
through process for the survivors." Masters at al., supra note 180, at 116.
192. See, e.g., Morefield, supra note 189, at 6 (describing a defendant's mother's testimony
"on her pain and anguish at finding her son in this situation"). In Booth, the defendant deliv-
ered an allocution to the jurors emphasizing the "terrible effect" of the prosecution on him and
his family, as evidenced by the attempted suicide of his wife, his grandfather's death, and the
anticipated death of his grandmother in the event he were sentenced to die. See Joint Appendix,
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (No. 86-5020). In a variation on this theme, Huertas's
counsel elicited from the victim's mother at the penalty trial that Huertas's grandparents (who
had raised him) were terribly hurt because of "what their son did to [her] son." See Joint Ap-
pendix, Ohio v. Huertas, supra note 92, at 135. The prosecutor then brought out that the vic-
tim's demise could not have hurt Huertas's family as much as her, since "they still have Eddie;
and I don't have Ralph"-thereby expressly creating a contest of weeping families. See generally
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1439 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (in penalty summation, prose-
cutor compared suffering of victim's and defendant's families), vacated on other grounds, 478
U.S. 1016 (1986).
193. See Morefield, supra note 189, at 8; supra text accompanying note 180.
194. See supra note 189.
195. Morefield, supra note 189, at 8. According to Ms. Morefield: "Had the parole board
released my son's killer I would have assumed it was some failure on my part-maybe I didn't
write eloquently enough of my pain, maybe I didn't speak strongly enough of my grief. Maybe it
was because I didn't cry." Id.
196. See Henderson, supra note 118, at 996; see generally Hall, supra note 127, at 243-45
(studies regarding victim attitudes "seem almost equally supportive of both vindictiveness and
forgiveness claims").
197. Morefield, supra note 189, at 8. The fact that death is, arguably, deserved in the former
case will not necessarily mitigate the pain and regret of the witness. At times, even when a family
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Thus, we see that Payne encourages the prosecution to urge mourn-
ing family and friends to present their grief in a forum ill-suited to
respond to it, yet holding out a seductive (if illusory) capacity to do
so. Too many victims, like Justice O'Connor,198 view the criminal
court as a place for society to "give ... back" a portion of what the
dead or their loved ones lost. This is impossible.'9 The system is not
equipped to nurture victims or their representatives.2 00
Above all, the penalty phase of a capital trial cannot function as a
substitute therapeutic environment. Acknowledging that truth in no
way implies a cold or complacent attitude toward the victims of the
gravest offenses. To the contrary, such a posture permits frank focus
on the actual purpose of the proceeding: to determine the "personal
responsibility and moral guilt" of the defendant.20' At the same time,
it avoids cruelly raising the expectation of succor from an inappropri-
ate source, only to disappoint many when the system turns upon them
or their dead, wholly ignores them, or (at best) offers merely partial
or temporary relief. The Payne majority, therefore, made a word of
promise to victims' ears that reality will surely break to the hope.202
member continues to want the murderer to die, the latter's death does not bring peace. See, e.g.,
Speech by Dorothea Morefield, Manila, The Philippines 7 (Nov. 29, 1989) (on file with author)
(a victim's father, whose son's murder destroyed his life, attempted suicide on day after execu-
tion of killer); cf. Masters et al., supra note 180, at 115 (some survivors wish for murderer's
execution in order to put a halt to "disturbing revenge fantasies").
198. See supra note 112.
199. For example, "[flamilies expect a ritualistic expression of regret and concern from the
court, but it does not come." George S. Getzel & Rosemary Masters, Serving Families Who
Survive Homicide Victims, 65 Soc. CAsEwoRK: J. CoNTEMP. Soc. WoRK 138, 140 (1984). Sur-
viving parents may also "evidence a magical wish that caring, considerate police and courts can
bring back their dead children .... The reality of the criminal justice system, however, cannot
be dismissed." Id. at 143.
200. See Spungen Interview, supra note 23, at 10-11; Gibbons, supra note 23, at 68 (quoting
Roberta Roper); Sprang et al., supra note 180, at 162 ("Family members of murder victims are
victimized twice: first by the criminal and second by the system"). When victims become aware
of this fact, they experience anger. See Miller et al., supra note 23, at 434-35. Notably, survivors
who feel guilty about the murder, see supra note 180 and accompanying text, are already dis-
posed to displace that guilt, in the form of rage and blame, onto "'society' and especially society
in the persons of police, prosecutors and judges." See Masters et al., supra note 180, at 119.
Those actors should, at least, refrain from inflicting further harm through gratuitously insensi-
tive treatment. See, e.g., Sprang et al., supra note 180 (describing middle-of-the-night call from
police morgue: "'Your son's been fatally shot. Please pick up his belongings."'). Finally, there
are limited ways officials can help victims without infringing on the rights of defendants. See,
e.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (among
other things, granting victim right to receive physical protection and restitution from the defen-
dant as well as pertinent information from the authorities); Masters et al., supra note 180 (de-
scribing New York City Victim Services Agency's pilot program of outreach and counseling);
Miller et al., supra note 23 (describing similar support group in Hartford, Connecticut).
201. See supra text accompanying note 40.
202. See WILLIAM SHtAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, se. 8.
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I turn now to some final thoughts about the topic of this essay,
which derive from my own background. Since law review articles typi-
cally deal in ostensibly objective analyses,203 I do so quite hesitantly-
hoping that individual pain, growth, and reflection, experienced in a
context different from anything touched upon thus far, can yield
modest further insight.
V. EPILOGUE
A. The Road Taken
It would be tempting to claim that abolitionist sentiment caused me
to choose to spend my tour at LDF wholly on death penalty cases. But
it would also be untrue. When I joined the Capital Punishment Pro-
ject, I had no feelings about the subject and little inherent interest in
it-so little, in fact, that I used to skip over the long and arcane Su-
preme Court opinions in the area. I opted for capital litigation solely
because my expertise in criminal law, developed both as a prosecutor
and an academic, ensured a quicker start-up time than if I had picked
some other field in which LDF's attorneys labored, such as Title VII
or voting rights. And, indeed, I chose well. I crammed a lot of enrich-
ing experience into that year and brought it back to Columbia with
me, as I continued to litigate, write, speak, and lobby against execu-
tion.
Yet who can tell if the road not taken might have proven "as just as
fair? ' '204 Like capital lawyering, anti-discrimination work attracts fine
people with excellent skills. Among them, too, I would surely have
found wonderful friends and valued colleagues and shared important
goals and tasks, as I did defending death-sentenced prisoners. Even on
that different track, I would perhaps have argued in the Supreme
Court-as I did after leaving the Fund205-because the opportunity is
not uncommon in any of LDF's specialties.
With hindsight, however, I believe that in certain ways the road I
took has, for me (as for the poet, Robert Frost), "made all the differ-
ence. "'06 This is because it led to my past as well as my future, ena-
203. But some authors have broken with convention. Witness, for example, Professor Susan
Estrich's courageous recounting of her rape. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087-
88 (1986).
204. R01ERT FROST, THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 105 (Edward C. Lathem ed. 1969) (from
the poem "The Road Not Taken").
205. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
206. FROST, supra note 204, at 105.
PAYNE AND SUFFERING
bling me to gain perspective on a troubling aspect of my background.
To that subject I now turn.
B. Earlier Roads: Walking in Other People's Shoes
Born in the forties in New York City, I grew up in what was then a
benign environment. I was comfortably housed, well educated. I
played with my friends in safe streets and enjoyed clean neighborhood
parks. The same had been true of my parents thirty-odd years before,
a continent away in Vienna, Austria. Yet the journey that eventually
brought them here as Jewish refugees fleeing from Hitler, over a
rough and indirect route with a pit stop in Poland and an extended
stay in England, changed more than their physical surroundings; it
altered their emotional and spiritual landscape.
I, of course, knew only their transplanted selves. Guests on my soil,
orphaned by Auschwitz, they possessed-and were possessed by-a
vision of life that I could not share or even fathom. I spent my child-
hood trying to escape it. I resisted overt discussion of the past while
secretly, morbidly, drawn to its horrors. A strange Lethe20 7 instantly
drowned tales I had been unable to avoid: unwillingly hearing, I sim-
ply unheard. Cherished and sheltered by my family, I nevertheless be-
lieved the world a dangerous place. My mother identified with her
parents, and I with her. Twice removed from death and destruction, I
had no name or explanation for the shadows hovering around my life.
But by virtue of merely existing, I felt a sense of obligation.
Years later, I came to know that the fate which saved the fortunate
from annihilation2°s frequently left them209 and their children2 10 guilt-
207. In Greek mythology, Lethe was the river of forgetfulness in Hades.
208. My own parents, who fled the Holocaust in central Europe only to endure bombing in
London, fortuitously averted death again on the last leg of their voyage. After finally succeeding
in getting American visas, with great effort they booked places on a ship sailing to New York
City. At the eleventh hour, however, Cook's travel agency (then notorious for inefficiency)
called to say a mistake had been made-there was no room on the boat in question! One can
imagine their consternation. Cook's assured them they could go on the next trip, a few days
later. Having no choice, they accepted this offer; their journey was, happily, uneventful. But
when they arrived in New York, my parents found their relatives in mourning. The first ship, the
City of Benares, had been torpedoed and sunk at sea.
209. The literature about the Holocaust and its survivors is immense. See, e.g., BRUNO BET-
TELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS (1979); HERMAN LANGBEIN, MENSCHN IN AUSCHWITZ
(1972); Judith S. Kestenberg & Milton Kestenberg, Psychoanalyses of Children of Survivors
from the Nazi Persecution: The Continuing Struggle of Survivor Parents, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 368
(1982).
210. For examples of studies of the second generation, see HELEN EPSTEIN, CHILDREN OF THE
HOLOCAUST: CONVERSATIONS WITH SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF SURVIVORS (1979); Russell E. Phil-
lips, Impact of Nazi Holocaust on Children of Survivors, 32 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 370 (1978);
Kestenberg & Kestenberg, supra note 209. In this section, I draw heavily on Epstein's book as
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ridden21l' as much as grateful, in addition to creating a host of other
reactions and symptoms common to disaster survivors.212 Understand-
ing that I and my family were not alone, I confronted my personal
demons and, like many of the second generation, sought to repay the
debt of the living by "doing good" through both volunteer and pro-
fessional work. 13 Even death penalty litigation did not strike me as
inconsistent with my visceral identification with victims. Although
meriting grave punishment, the murderer was, typically, a victim, too:
of poverty, racial discrimination, mental illness, or retardation, and
emotional and physical abuse or neglect.
Yet, long after my accidental conscription into the Booth case,214 I
began to question why I was maintaining such deep involvement with
victims' advocates' banner issue-and, of course, on the "wrong"
side. It was as if I had chosen to wave a red flag of defiance before
them. By this point, I had also learned that survivors of ordinary
well as on my own experience. E.g., compare EPSTEIN at 26, 179 (the children forget painful
stories) and EPSTEIN at 209 (the parents convey sense of danger) with this Article's text accompa-
nying note 207.
211. See Yacl Danicli, Countertransference in the Treatment and Study of Nazi Holocaust
Survivors and Their Children, 5 VICTIMOLoGY 355, 357 (1980); EPSTEIN, supra note 210, at 177.
As often, poetry conveys a message more sharply than prose:
Both my parents died in camps
I was not there to comfort them
I was not there they were alone
my mind refuses to conceive
the life the death they must have known
I must atone because I live
... [Nlone shall say in my defence
had I been there to comfort them
it would have made no difference[.]
KAREN GERSHON, SELECTED POEMS, 11 (1966) (excerpt from "I Was Not There") (emphasis
added).
212. See Masters et al., supra note 180, at 113. Commenting on the vogue of Holocaust
exploitation and popularization, Bruno Bettelheim bitterly noted: "Suddenly, everyone began
calling himself a survivor .... [Slome who had spent the war on a Kibbutz or in a fancy apart-
ment in Manhattan, now claim that they too have survived the Holocaust, probably by proxy."
BETTEL-EIM, supra note 209, at 96. I take his point. Indeed, in other settings as well, "victim-
hood" has come to carry an odd cachet-as people suddenly declare themselves afflicted with
hitherto unknown syndromes like "codependency." See Cynthia Heimel, It's Now, It's Trendy,
It's Codependency, PLAYBOY, May 1990, at 43. By sharing with the reader a bit of my own and
my family's experience, I in no way intend to diminish the suffering of those who endured the
camps. But I wish to stress that mere residence in a comfortable apartment in New York City did
not insulate my mother and father from the agony caused by their parents' murders.
213. One Holocaust survivor's daughter who did volunteer work similar to mine described
her emotional impulse as follows: '"I was very aware that my roots had been hacked away
mercilessly in Europe and that no one had cared. For most of my adolescent life "caring" about
others, especially those persecuted or less fortunate than myself motivated me to help and to
represent the good."' EPSTEIN, supra note 210, at 308.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
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homicides undergo forms of rage, grief, fear, guilt, fatigue, numbing,
and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder remarkably sim-
ilar to those of victims of mammoth catastrophes such as the Holo-
caust and Hiroshima. 21 5
These later-discovered analogues to my family's emotional history
only intensified my desire to grasp more thoroughly the vice of victim
impact evidence. The fact that Booth advanced the interests of capital
clients did not, to me, explain my reflexive support of its principle,
given that I had been bombarded with victims' viewpoints since my
childhood. Nor could I rationalize this stance as a distancing from
survivors' voices. True, I had shut my ears to them earlier, but I had
come to terms with my background. I now realize that personal ab-
sorption with mass murder arising out of group bias sensitized me
from the beginning to the social divisiveness, not to speak of immoral-
ity, of valuing some lives over others. Far from clashing, head and
heart readily concurred in embracing Booth and rejecting Payne; ex-
perience ratified legal insight.
Recall that the Nazis preyed on people they considered unworthy of
life: Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals. The perceived sub-human status of
the targets ostensibly justified any manner of outrage against them.
Transported and later tattooed like cattle, victims were rated against
one another in the fashion of animals. Camp commanders directed
the younger and healthier captives rightward, to work; the old and
weak, leftward, to die. 216 While there is clearly no moral equivalence
between genocide and capital punishment as practiced in the United
States,217 the former by its very extremity highlights the need to resist
all officially encouraged invidious distinctions founded on a person's
class or caste. To countenance a capital sentencing procedure that al-
lows 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate,"' ' ' 1 8
as does Payne with respect to victims, is to permit "grading" of hu-
mans, which Nazism (if nothing else) should brand as utterly beyond
the pale. For a victim's status assumes no greater legitimacy as a basis
215. See Masters et al., supra note 180, at 113-18. Homicide survivors, in particular, "differ
greatly in their reactions to death from individuals who grieve the loss of a loved one who died
nonviolently. . . . [M]ourning for families of murder victims is more profound, more lingering,
and more complex than normal grief." Sprang et al., supra note 180, at 159.
216. The Nazis were not the sole predators to engage in such selections. See STANLEY ELKINS,
SLAVERY 100 n.29 (1976).
217. I make this obvious observation only because I have heard certain opponents of the
death penalty compare it to the Holocaust. That offends me, though I am sure no offense is
intended. Cf BETTELISEIM, supra note 212 (resentment at expansion of concept of "Holocaust
survivor"). One could, however, say that the system's discriminatory features reflect "the ob-
noxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive"-yet still, deeply repellent-form. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
218. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
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for the lawful act of sparing or condemning a murderer than for the
lawless murder itself."1 9
Furthermore, the impetus behind Booth's overruling, the idea that
victims must be treated as unique in the context of capital penalty
hearings, loses what little meaning it has when one reflects on the
murder of millions. Suspend practical objections briefly to imagine a
series of Nuremberg trials at which relatives appeared to extol their
loved ones. Otto Frank might have spoken of his daughter Anne's
diary220 or read from it to the court or jurors.122 Perhaps my mother
would have described her own mother's artistic bent or her father's
gregarious nature. My father, on his part, could have discussed his
mother's deep devotion to him and his father's success as a business
lawyer. But naturally there were some who died with their whole fam-
ily, others who had become estranged or orphaned for unrelated rea-
sons, and still others-thieves, dropouts, mentally retarded,
emotionally ill, or merely unlikable-who would have gotten no enco-
mia and, possibly, no recognition at all.
Can anyone seriously claim that a concentration camp guard who
killed Anne Frank would have deserved execution more, on account
of his victim's goodness or talent, than one who killed a disreputable
inmate? Or should her murder evoke greater concern from the jury on
account of Mr. Frank's eloquence in articulating his loss? (For those
who feel that any such person should receive death, I could hypothe-
size similar crimes by an eighteen-year-old, loyal to his friends, an al-
tar boy and a good student, heavily influenced by Nazi teachers,
which many might consider a closer issue on the matter of sentence.) I
have, of course, previously raised such rhetorical questions regarding
current actual cases and intimated the same answer.
Yet, in extending my purview beyond "run-of-the-mill" murders
and trials, I have attempted to underscore the moral absurdity of
219. The proliferation of hate crime statutes, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CoDa ANN. § 2927.12
(Anderson 1987), makes it plain that we have a broad societal consensus on the need to deter
victim-discriminatory offenses. But cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (St. Paul hate
crime ordinance held facially invalid under First Amendment). Regrettably, neither the 20th cen-
tury's mega-horror of state persecution of'Jews and other unpopular minorities nor the current
plague of random, private incidents of this nature, to which those statutes are addressed, has
instilled the lesson that killing defendants because of who their victims were or were not-in the
sense of distinguishing among their different religions, races and so forth-assumes some of the
odiousness of killing victims for those reasons. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(imposing prohibitively high standard of proof on defendants seeking to establish discrimination
in capital sentencing).
220. See ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNc GIRL (1972).
221. Because we are not bound by history in this scenario, we can also conjure up jurors-
although, to be sure, not German ones. (The actual proceedings took place before a multi-na-
tional panel of judges.)
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ranking victims and their relatives-whether expressly222 or implic-
itly.223 If not six or sixty, then six million deaths should make the
point that the grave is the ultimate equalizer. Justice O'Connor voiced
a related truth in Payne'2 4 but drew the wrong conclusion from it. I
hope that, when the dust settles and victims' groups turn their atten-
tion to new causes, many capital jurisdictions will voluntarily adhere
to Booth. Equally, I hope that more survivors will come to endorse it
by recognizing Payne's approach as a fraud on themselves and on
those whose shoes they have donned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Not all victims' rights proposals actually advance victims' interests.
In the words of Professor Lynne N. Henderson, herself a target of
violent crime, many "are problematic at best and may actually be psy-
chologically destructive to the victim." 21 The rule of Payne consti-
tutes one such misguided effort. It plays well to the television
cameras; it operates poorly in the courtroom. Worst of all, from my
vantage, it denigrates victims while falsely promising help to their
mourners. Private forums will better serve to mend hearts and honor
the dead.
222. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, IlII S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(speaking of victim impact evidence as "intended to identify some victims as more worthy of
protection than others").
223. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47 (tacit appeals to impose death because of
victim's race or social or financial standing); cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 355-56 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) ("What we have held to be unconstitutional if included in the language of
the statute, surely cannot be constitutional because it is a de facto characteristic of the sys-
tem.").
224. See 11 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) ("[Murder] trans-
forms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is
special and unique about the person.").
225. Henderson, supra note 118, at 938 n.3, 955.
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